Application of international human rights online - balancing privacy, freedom of information, and national security by Zaure, Agnes
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
FACULTY OF LAW 
Department of Public Law 
 
 
 
 
 
Agnes Zaure 
 
 
 
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ONLINE- BALANCING 
PRIVACY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
 
 
Master thesis 
 
 
 
Advisor 
Dr.iur. EnekenTikk-Ringas 
Co-advisor 
Prof. Lauri Mälksoo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tartu 
2016 
 
 2 
Table of content 
Table of content ........................................................................................................................................ 2 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 3 
A Scope of legal protection and limitations ............................................................................................. 7 
I. Scope of legal protection for privacy, freedom of information and national security ........ 7 
1. Right to privacy .............................................................................................................. 7 
2. Freedom of information ................................................................................................ 11 
3. National security ........................................................................................................... 13 
II. System of limitations ........................................................................................................ 17 
1. General requirements .................................................................................................... 17 
2. Privacy vs Freedom of Information .............................................................................. 20 
3. Freedom of Information vs National security............................................................... 22 
4. National Security vs Privacy ........................................................................................ 25 
4. Triangular perspective .................................................................................................. 29 
III Midway conclusions ........................................................................................................ 30 
B Current State Practice ......................................................................................................................... 32 
I Relevant State Practice ...................................................................................................... 32 
1. The United States ......................................................................................................... 32 
2. The United Kingdom .................................................................................................... 34 
2. France ........................................................................................................................... 37 
4. The Russian Federation ................................................................................................ 40 
5. China ............................................................................................................................. 44 
II Reasons for States Practice .............................................................................................. 47 
III Midway conclusions ........................................................................................................ 50 
C Future International Standard Set ....................................................................................................... 51 
I Democracy at stake ............................................................................................................ 51 
II Recommendations for Solutions ........................................................................................ 52 
III Proposed balance project for the future .......................................................................... 54 
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 59 
Kokkuvõte .............................................................................................................................................. 64 
Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................................... 67 
Reference ................................................................................................................................................ 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Introduction  
 
A transfer of electronic data by Internet users has contributed in a major way to the 
complexity of legal relations in an interconnected world. States are faced with the increasing 
doctrinalization of cyberspace challenges while constituting and exercising individual rights 
and freedoms. Recently, the United Nations resolution, stating that the same standards for the 
international human rights must be protected online, did not put to rest the tedious debate 
about the question of re-considering the position of civil liberties and national security 
established in international human rights treaties in times of continuous escalation of new 
emerging threats to national security.   
 
This inevitable tension in the search for the compromise between polar views on the 
international human rights and national security has not been solved yet. As a result, the new 
emerging threats to national security and the relatively vague wording of binding international 
legal standards have led states to re-consider the balance of civil liberties and national security 
established in international human rights treaties and to start implementing at national level a 
number of new rules to create the legal ground for the increasing application of security 
measures online. The absence of a shared vision on the future of legitimate limitations of the 
human rights in favour of national security interests has resulted in a polar dichotomy 
between judicial, legislative and executive powers among States that endangers the existing 
understanding of democracy and the rule of law.  
 
The controversy between State actors of the internet society stands at the crossroad: deciding 
whether it is possible to continue the application of the balance model according to the 
existing universal treaties in the light of changed national security needs, or not. Emerging 
case-law differs between regions, such as the EU, the US and the UK, with substantially 
divergent balances between privacy, freedom of information and national security. Discussion 
of these issues introduces both conservative and libertarian views where emphasis is tilted 
towards the view that there is no need to reinvent human rights, rather that existing standards 
must be interpreted according to the online challenges. On the other hand, there are States 
chiefly motivated not to ensure the ‘old’ human rights in an online environment and 
encourage for the ‘new’ human rights for the Internet age. During these debates, no answers 
have so far been presented for how to find a common balance between the parallel demands 
of privacy, freedom of security and national security in existing international legal 
instruments so that States would more likely follow them. As there is no specific international 
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treaty or convention on what are these minimum guarantees that should be followed for the 
sustainable promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms online, it is 
essential to provide recommendations on the balance between the parallel demands of 
privacy, freedom of security and national security in international legal instruments that more 
willingly will be accepted by the leading States.  
 
In the light of these questions the thesis will propose a project for the balance to be followed 
by States aiming to diminish the polar dichotomy between the judicial, legislative and 
executive powers by establishing minimum standards for international human rights 
restrictions in the name of national security in the context of electronic data processing. For 
the purpose of achieving this aim, the thesis looks at the minimum scope of protection for 
international human rights in cyberspace and revises which legal expectations contained in 
international human rights treaties States must meet. Further, the thesis examines the balance 
of rights focused upon at the international level. For the next stage, the thesis intends to reveal 
regional implementations of national regulations and explore how these balances correspond 
to the international standards discovered above. For this reason, the thesis systematically 
explores the current practice of the most influential States and regions in global cyber security 
decision-making. If any contradiction is found, the thesis reveals the reasons that States used 
to justify a practise of online security measures contrary to the international treaties. If these 
reasons can be solved by international legal measures, the thesis proposes recommendations 
on potential solutions to achieve unity and clarity of balances for the rights and national 
security to be considered as relevant standards for future practice.  
 
The thesis focuses precisely from the view of these rights as the most hotly so far debated 
human rights with respect to electronic communication online. The model for the triangular 
approach of the thesis originates from research papers1 issued by ICT4Peace Norms Project 
for Hague Global Conference on Cyberspace. The thesis suggests seeing privacy, freedom of 
information, and national security as a complex concept of the interrelationship of all three 
aspects applicable in cyber matters which deserve closer study as a three-dimensional 
paradigm appearing in legal matters of electronic data processing. So far, the international 
courts in related matters have been focused mainly on a two-sided approach, instead of the 
approaching issues through the triangle of themes. The proposed approach is seen from the 
                                                 
1E. Tikk-Ringas. Norms for International Peace and Security: Privacy, Freedom of Information and National 
Security. ICT4Peace Norms Project. April 2015, p 3. -
https://www.gccs2015.com/sites/default/files/documents/Working%20PaperPrivacy,%20Freedom%20of%20Inf
ormation%20and%20National%20Security.pdf (16.02.2016).  
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following perspectives: the right to privacy, as a protection from extraction of information on 
individuals and contexts; the freedom of information, as part of freedom of expression, in the 
sense of the right to receive and impart information; and, in particular, national security, as in 
the security of nation states against man-made threats.  
 
To achieve this aim, the thesis examines human rights standards set in the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice, as well as selected 
regional regulations, regulatory trends and future prospects. The thesis concentrates on 
interpretations by the main treaty bodies of the United Nations system, as well as regional 
systems of European organisations. The interpretation of a particular right will be guided also 
by resolutions or general comments adopted on occasion by treaty bodies to give a fairly 
detailed guide. Most interpretation has been drawn through judgments or other forms of 
decision in a context of specific cases. 
 
The thesis follows the logic of systematic analysis of those foremost questions in order to 
check the validity of the hypothesis raised up and also to achieve the final aim of research. 
The thesis opens by analysing the legal scope of protection for focused human rights: privacy 
and limits of free flow of electronic data transmitted via Internet facilities, as well as where 
courts have decided limitations are appropriate in favour of national security interests. In 
order to explore potential common denominators and shared attributes in the existing human 
rights instruments, the thesis will examine in the first chapter the legal scope of protection for 
each cornerstone of the triangle and find which circumstances can justify their limiting.  
 
After discovering the normative standards, the relevant State practice will be examined to 
explore which model of balances States have been favouring. In cases of any disparities, the 
second chapter examines the extent of disparity between norms and States' practices. The 
obstacles to their interpretation and implementation will be analysed in the second chapter. If 
a major disparity is discovered, then for the purpose of answering the question on how the 
best to apply human rights in the context of rapidly developing information and 
communications technologies and what could be future standards and recommendations, the 
third chapter will analyse future solutions for those foremost questions.  
 
Regarding methodology, for the purpose of examining the development of the balances before 
and after the terrorist attacks 9/11, in Madrid 2004 and London 2005, the historical research 
method is applied to see the shift in the national state regulations and relevant case-law. The 
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comparative method has been applied to reveal what can be the minimum common 
denominators of the human rights for the states to be considered as acceptable legal standards 
to be obeyed. Finally, the qualitative method has been applied to the relevant case-law 
analysis necessary to find out the judicial concept on the balance. The thesis relies also on an 
analytical and systematic approach to the respective case-law and legal documents study 
related to the tasks of thesis both on regional and national levels. In addition, and alongside 
the comparative and historical methods, synthetic methods will be used. The comparative 
method is used to reveal disparities between European legal standards in regulatory 
documents and the States' practices with their national regulations. The second chapter uses 
both systematic and synthetic methods. The historical method is used in case-law analysis to 
see whether there are fundamental differences between case-law before wide use of electronic 
communication and after.  
 
The main sources used for the research are normative instruments and the authoritative 
commentaries by respectful legal scholars on international treaties, as well as commentative 
reports by political organisations and impartial rapporteurs that deserved respect to be reliable 
in respective discussions. Also, the thesis is based on relevant empirical case-law study of the 
national or regional courts. The European Union, the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom, and Russia are examined with regards to the compatibility of the national and the 
international legal standards of the human rights limitations. These States had the most 
attention as these are territories which are generally lauded for fulfilling commitment to the 
protection of human rights. These are also countries that have experienced challenges to their 
national security as a result of both foreign and domestic terrorism.  
 
The human rights treaties themselves make no mention of the types of situations in which the 
provisions are to apply. However, it is evident from the wording of the 2012 UN Human 
Rights Council resolution2 confirming that the same human rights that people have offline 
must also be protected online, thus, the resolution establishes protection of human rights in 
online as well. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 United Nations General Asembly. The right to privacy in the digital age. A/RES/68/167. 21 January 2014, para. 
Available: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/167.  
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A Scope of legal protection and limitations 
I. Scope of legal protection for privacy, freedom of information and national security  
 
For the purpose of better understanding the interrelations between respective human rights, it 
is essential to understand the core nature of these rights. This section focuses on 
interpretations by the main international treaty bodies of the United Nations and the European 
Union systems in cyberspace. A general interpretation is divided into subsections which 
represent the right to privacy from the international human rights law and the European law 
perspectives.  
1. Right to privacy 
a) Protection under the United Nations regulation 
 
The UN secured the right to privacy in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 
(hereinafter UDHR) Article 12 (1) where the term "privacy” became  an umbrella term4 for 
privacy, family, home, correspondence, honour and reputation of individuals. It constitutes 
that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” In addition, seventeen years after 
drafting the UDHR, the provision on the right to privacy was worded in the Covenant on the 
Civil and Political Rights5 (hereinafter ICCPR) Article 17 (1) which almost identically 
repeated the concept of the right to privacy in Article 12 (1) of the UDHR. The sole difference 
between those provisions consists in the legal base for restriction while the ICCPR prohibits 
also unlawful interferences to one´s privacy.6  
 
Within the UN Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files7, adopted by the 
UN General Assembly, the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data8 are legal instruments addressing the protection of the 
                                                 
3The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948. 
4O. Diggelmann, M. Cleis. How the Right to Privacy Became a Human Right. -Human Rights Law Review 
2014. No 14, p 447. 
5The Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights, 1966.  
6
 O. Diggelmann, M. Cleis, p 449. 
7The UN Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files. Doc E/CN.4/1990/72, 20.2.1990.-
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r095.htm, 14.12.1990.  
8
 The OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. Paris 
1980.-https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf.  
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privacy with regards to electronic data transfers. Thus, the United Nations (hereinafter UN) 
has acknowledged the protection of privacy regards to data transfers.  
 
In 1988 the Human Rights Committee (hereinafter Committee), which is a monitoring body to 
implementation of Article 19 of the ICCPR, analysed the content of the right to privacy in its 
General Comment No. 16, according to which Article 17 aims to protect individuals from any 
unlawful and arbitrary interferences with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence, and 
national legal frameworks must provide for the protection of this right. This provision 
imposes specific obligations relating to the protection of privacy in communications, 
underlining that “correspondence should be delivered to the addressee without interception 
and without being opened or otherwise read. In relation to surveillance, whether electronic or 
otherwise, interceptions of telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of communication, wire-
tapping and recording of conversations, were prohibited.9 Consequently, in 1980s the right to 
privacy in regulation was highly valued and protected and restrictions were considered 
exceptional. Both assured that the right to privacy involves the protection of separation from 
society.  
 
Both international treaties provided an almost universal scope of protection, however some 
treaties, such as the African Charter on Human and People´s Rights,10 Article 9 which uses for 
the right to privacy a different formulation. Despite the fact that the UDHR does not have 
directly binding effect on States, it is widely regarded as having acquired legal force as 
customary international law.11  
 
In 17 April 2013 the UN General Assembly issued Report of the Special Rapporteur to the 
Human Rights Council12 which argues that the right to privacy is a qualified right, but its 
interpretation raises challenges with respect to what constitutes the private sphere and in 
establishing notions of what constitutes public interest. Here the UN Special Rapporteur 
specified that privacy can be defined as the presumption that individuals should have an area 
of autonomous development, interaction and liberty, a “private sphere” with or without 
                                                 
9Centre for Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) General Comment No. 16. (General Comments), p 8. 
10The African Charter on Human and People´s Rights, 1981.  
11Article 19. The Johannesburg principles on national security, freedom of expression and access to information. 
November 1996, p 2. 
12F.La Rue. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression. 17.04.2013. - http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/23/40 (16.02.2016).  
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interaction with others, free from State intervention and from excessive unsolicited 
intervention by other uninvited individuals.13 
 
As the right to privacy is the ability of individuals to determine who holds information about 
them and how that information is used,14 individuals must be also able to ensure that 
communications remain private, secure, and, if they choose, anonymous while exercising their 
right to privacy in communications. The UN Report on the privacy of communications infers 
that individuals are able to exchange information and ideas in a space that is beyond the reach 
of other members of society, the private sector, and ultimately the State itself where security 
of communications means that individuals should be able to verify that their communications 
are received only by their intended recipients, without interference or alteration, and that the 
communications they receive are equally free from intrusion. Therefore, one of the most 
important advances enabled by the Internet is anonymity of communications which allows 
individuals to express themselves freely without fear of retribution or condemnation.15  
b) Protection under the European Union regulation 
 
Within the European Union region the right to privacy is guaranteed primarily by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms16 
(hereinafter ECHR) which is binding upon Council of Europe states and which similarly to 
UN lays down the precise legal criteria of the protection of the right to privacy.17 The first 
paragraph of Article 8 of the ECHR provides the content of the right to privacy by stating: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence“.18   
 
As mentioned above, despite the fact that private life has complex contours, pursuant to the 
case-law of the ECHT, Article 8 covers protection of individuals against attacks on honour 
and reputation, the use of a person´s name, identity, or likeness, being spied upon, watched, or 
harassed, and the disclosure of information protected by the duty of professional secrecy19. 
                                                 
13F.La Rue. 2013, p 17. 
14Lester and D. Pannick (Ed). Human Rights Law and Practice. London: Butterworth 2004, para 4.82. 
15F.La Rue. 2013, pp 6-11. 
16Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 1950.-
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  
17P. Malanczuk. Freedom of Information and Communication. -Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law. April 2011, para 47. 
18The European Convention on Human Rights. 1950.  
19
 C. Velu. The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Respect for Private Life, the Home and 
Communications. Cited in: R. White, C. Ovey. The European Convention on Human Right. 5th Ed., Oxford 
Univeristy Press, p 357. 
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Today the right to privacy involves protection of not only physical distance20 from society, 
but also it shields the person against unwanted gazes from a distance, including from any 
forms of interception of electronic communications, which might include the opening of 
communications, Internet activity, or listening to telephone communications.21  
 
The provision covered the right to privacy almost exactly copying UN treaty bodies in 
interpreting the right22. There is not much evidence on what drafters of the ECHR meant by 
the term "privacy” or "private life” as there are hardly any records of discussions of 
fundamental matters, such as aspects of privacy,23 thus, the European Court on Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECtHR) has attempted a general explanation in numerous decisions on the scope 
of the protection of private life with regards to interference in electronic communications. 
Particularly, in A v. France, the ECtHR found that the use of covert technological devices to 
intercept private communications falls within the scope of Article 8 of ECHR as "a telephone 
conversation does not lose its private character solely because its content concerned or might 
concern the public interest” 24. In addition, in Halford v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR  
ruled that telephone calls made from business premises as well as from the home and 
intercepted by police, probably with the aim of gathering material to assist in the defence of 
proceedings, might be covered by the notions of "private life" within the meaning of Article 
8.25  As a contrast, where an applicant used a radio channel for civil aircraft, the interception 
did not constitute interference with private life since the conversation was on a wavelength 
accessible to other users and could not be classified as private communication.26 Thus, the 
collection of private information by covert surveillance operators to find out about an 
individual without his consent will always concern his/her private life and will thus fall within 
the scope of Article 8. 
 
Consequently, it might be concluded that the core nature of the right to privacy in online 
protection covers the protection of individuals against any attacks on honour and reputation, 
the use of a person´s name, identity, or likeness, without being spied upon, watched, or 
                                                 
20Ibid, p 458. 
21Robin White, Clare Ovey. The European Convention on Human Right. 5. Ed. Oxford Univeristy Press: 2010, 
pp 365-366. 
22O. Diggelmann, M. Cleis. How the Right to Privacy Became a Human Right. -Human Rights Law Review 
2014. No 14, p 452. 
23Ibid, p 457. 
24ECtHR 14838/89,  A. v. France,  23 November 1993, para 35.  
25ECtHR 20605/92. Halford v. the United Kingdom, 25 June 1997, para 44. 
26U. Kilkelly.The right to respect for private and family life. A guide to the implementation of Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Human rights handbooks, No. 1. Directorate General of Human Rights 
Council of Europe. 2003, p 13. 
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harassed, and the disclosure of information protected by the duty of professional secrecy. 
Thus, any activity online concerning an individual´s data transmission via Internet is included 
to the protection of the private sphere. 
2. Freedom of information 
a) Protection under the United Nations regulation 
 
Since 1946, the freedom of information was recognised as a fundamental human right at the 
UN General Assembly, in Resolution 59 (I) of 14 December 1946, in particular, by the US, 
the UK, and France who convened at the initiation.27 Legal guarantees for the freedoms of 
opinion, expression, and information in the universal treaties, such as Article 19 of the 
UDHR, as well Article 19 (2) of the ICCPR, became universally recognised.  
 
Article 19 (2) of the ICCPR provides that: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.” Under Article 19 of the UDHR: “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers”. There is no universally agreed legal definition of the freedom of 
information provided by either the UDHR or the ICCPR, but the freedom of information has 
been recognised as subcategory of the freedom of expression.28 
 
The UN General Comment No 34 on freedom of opinion and expression29 affirms that under 
the UN all forms of expression and the means of their dissemination are protected. Such 
forms include spoken, written and sign language and such non-verbal expression as images 
and objects of art. Means of expression include books, newspapers, pamphlets, posters, 
banners, dress and legal submissions. They include all forms of audio-visual as well as 
electronic and internet-based modes of expression.  
 
                                                 
27P. Malanczuk. Freedom of Information and Communication. -Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law. April 2011, para 5. 
28Ibid, para 21. 
29General Comment No 34 on freedom of opinion and expression 2011. UN Human Rights Committee. 
CCPR/C/GC/34, para 11. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/CCPRGeneralCommentNo11.pdf 
(14.02.3016). 
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Further on, in 2013, it has been affirmed by the UN Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue30 that 
the freedom of information is fully applicable to the Internet. In 2011 the Special Rapporteur 
emphasized that Article 19 of the UDHR and the ICCPR was drafted with foresight to include 
and to accommodate future technological developments.31  
 
It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to enter into a full discussion of the various aspects 
of the questions concerning the right of access to information held by public bodies (incl. 
intelligence services, or other entities when such entities are carrying out public functions). 
They are excluded from attention as they do not directly relate to the triangular scope of the 
privacy, freedom of information and national security interests. But it should at least be noted 
that respective principles have been adopted in relevant freedom of information laws which 
are drawn up and endorsed by a group of international law experts in the UN documents. 
Also, cases where disclosed private information by private individuals became public 
according to their deliberate will, are also left out of discussion, as there should be no dispute 
over privacy protection.  
b) Protection under the European Union regulation 
 
The right to freedom of information is guaranteed in all 47 member states of the Council of 
Europe.32 In the EU region the right to freedom of information is guaranteed primarily by the 
ECHR Article 10 (1) which lays down that “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and 
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”. 
 
The content of the right has been explored in Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice 
Ross v. the United Kingdom33 and 10 Human Rights Organisations and Others v. the United 
Kingdom34, where the ECtHR has affirmed35 that Article 10 of the ECHR is fully applicable 
                                                 
30F.La Rue. 2013, p. 23.  
31Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression. A/HRC/17/27. - http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/17/27 (16.02.2016).  
32D. Voorhoof. The Right to Freedom of Expression and Information under the European Human Rights 
System: Towards a more Transparent Democratic Society. RSCAS 2014/12 2014. Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, p 1. - 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29871/RSCAS_2014_12.pdf?sequence=1 (16.03.2016). 
33ECtHR Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v. the United Kingdom, 62322/14, 11 September 
2014. 
34ECtHR 10 Human Rights Organisations and Others v. the United Kingdom, 24960/15, 20 May 2015. 
35European Court of Human Rights. New technologies. Factsheet. September 2014. -
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_New_technologies_ENG.pdf. (18.12.2014). 
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to the Internet. In Raichinov v Bulgaria,36 the ECtHR stated that freedom of expression is 
applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.37  
 
ECtHR has explained38 that the freedom of expression applies not only to the content of 
information but also to the means of its dissemination, since any restriction imposed on the 
latter necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information. Within the scope 
of the ECtHR the freedom of expression and information applies to the various forms and 
means in which information is transmitted and received, since any restriction imposed on the 
means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information.39 The analysis 
of jurisprudence of the ECtHR allows us to conclude that Internet related disputes 
undoubtedly fall within the scope of the right to information privacy. 
 
In conclusion, the protection of the freedom of information relates to all kinds and sorts of 
expression and the means of their dissemination, whether spoken, written and sign language 
and such non-verbal expression as images in books, newspapers, pamphlets, posters, banners, 
dress and legal submissions via Internet. Expressions do not have to please the audience, as 
under the freedom of information expressions that offend, shock, or disturb are also protected 
on the Internet.  
3. National security 
a) Protection under the United Nations regulation 
 
National security interests entail a need for States to protect their governmental structure, 
public order and rules of enforcement mechanisms.40 Almost all laws are created to protect 
the basic interests of States and to provide legal grounds for acting in favour of creating these 
interests despite individual human rights.41 The UN secured42 the interests of national security 
as an exception that should be read according to the meaning of previous paragraphs of the 
same article. This way, the rule for applying national security should be interpreted by reading 
                                                 
36ECtHR Raichinov v Bulgaria 47579/99 20, April 2006, para 47.  
37ECtHR Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom  13585/88, 26 November 1991, para.59-60. 
38
 ECtHR Case of Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey 3111/10, 18 December 2012, para 50.  
39ECtHR Autronic AG v. Switzerland 12726/87, 22 May 1990, para 47; ECtHR De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium 
19983/92,  24 February 1997, para 48. 
40K. Holmes. What is National Security? Index of US Military Strength 2015. - 
http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/important-essays-analysis/national-security/ (18.12.2014). 
41I. Cameron. National Security and the European Convention on Human Rights. Iustus Förlag: 2000, p 40-49.  
42Ibid, p 49.  
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the whole Article 19 of the ICCPR. Specifically, Article 19 (3) (b) provides that the exercise 
of rights indicated in the article carries with it special duties and responsibilities and may be 
subject to restriction, such as national security, except in cases where it is provided by law 
and is necessary.  
 
At the current time the most relevant restrictions to individual rights in the electronic data 
protection context are in line with “national security”, as“public order”, “public safety”, “the 
prevention of disorder or crime”, and “the rights and freedoms of others” fall out of the scope 
of research as, for the benefit of this research, the focus is set on national security interests. 
Even if justifications for the restrictions to individual rights in protection of national security 
usually are based on complex reasoning which includes merely all purposes, such as listed 
above regarding counter-terrorism measures43, the legal analysis on the system of rights 
limitations would be analogous for all listed grounds.  
 
The “national cyber security” term entails non-definable denominators which are rapidly 
changing and do not have static characteristics in cyber matters. Also, these constructions 
might work for interstate incidents but not where individuals are involved. A closer look at 
definitions shows that the state of protection is never measured, never certain and always 
contains contradictions. Also there is no guidance as to whose interests and criteria are 
considered. Therefore, restrictions for national cyber security could be applied in very broad 
circumstances where a judge considers that the interests of any party are endangered in a way 
that may affect national interests.  
 
Like national security, the concept of national cyber security is changing in accordance with a 
government's role and place in current time44, its national values, interests and goals, means 
and methods preventing and reflecting internal and external threats, as well as the basis of 
organisation and principles of systems functioning to grant national security. As cyberspace 
looks like the systematic sphere of our life, national cyber security can be seen as cross-
section of economic, social, political, military, spiritual-cultural, etc. fields of security where 
information systems can have a major effect.   
 
                                                 
43L. Doswald-Beck. Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, p 
415. 
44F. Wamala. ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide. September 2011, pp 42-43. - 
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/ITUNationalCybersecurityStrategyGuide.pdf (18.12.2014). 
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As there is no universally agreed positive definition on what constitutes national security or 
closely related terms such as “internal security” or “state security”, they vary from State to 
State.  There are some States that have defined national security on a regional level, including 
Sweden in its Criminal Code, Hungary in Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security Services, 
Spain in the National Defence Act of 2005, the United Kingdom in the Security Service Act 
1989, and Italy, which provides it by deduction specifically regarding the state secrets 
privilege from Article 39 (1) of Law 124/2007.45  
 
To compare European legal systems to American, the European ones are designed to ward off 
two types of threats: domestic and foreign. In the United States, national security is perceived 
mostly as security from foreign powers abroad, not from internal threats, and especially not 
from home-grown internal threats. On the bureaucratic level, there are no domestic 
counterparts to the country's foreign intelligence agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency 
(the "CIA") for human intelligence and the NSA for signals intelligence. By the Inter-
American Court concept, national security involves issues that address defence and protection 
of the secret services.46 Even so, these issues of secret service, as related to the comments of 
army, secret military information policy, freedom of expression issues of journalists 
employed for the national intelligence services, etc.,  do not fall within the aim of the thesis as 
these issues are intimately related to the military field and deserve more focused and 
independent research than the current research has been aiming for.  
 
It should be mentioned that a subcategory of national security is national cyber security47, that 
it is closely linked to informational society security, and therefore should be viewed together 
with it. Comparing the UK Cyber Security Strategy (2011), the US Department of Defense 
Cyber Strategy (2015), and the draft of the Concept of Russia’s Cyber Security Strategy 
(2014), we cannot find any interpretation of national cyber security. All three strategies refer 
to the point that national cyber security protection objects are information and the means of its 
transmission and that has both a direct and indirect affect on the results of individual´s, 
organisation´s and government´s activity (economical, political, military etc.). Additionally, 
                                                 
45S. Coliver. National Security and the Right to Information. 11 December 2012, p 6. -
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/coliver-nsp-pace20121220.pdf (18.12.2014). 
46L. Doswald-Beck. Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, p 
415. 
47K.Ziolkowski (Ed). Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. International Law, International 
Relations and Diplomacy. Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publication 2013, p 21. See also: The Cyber Index 
International Security Trends and Realities. UNIDIR/2013/3. New York, Geneva: United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research 2013. -http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyber-index-2013-en-463.pdf 
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the components are national, social, and personal values which might affect State territory, 
nation and jurisdiction. Indirectly, the components might be a system of dissolution, use and 
construction of information resources within a State, or a system of construction of the 
nation´s public consciousness which is based on the use of mass communication. Based on 
compared strategies we can deduce the States´ need to adopt a new cyber security strategy 
every 4-5 years,  reflecting changing needs and priorities of governments in a fast developing 
informational technology and therefore, the concepts of national cyber security.  
b) Protection under the European Union regulation 
 
The ECHR establishes restrictions to human rights as exceptions when used to protect 
national security, public order, defence or public safety. There is no definition of national 
security in the European legal instruments. National security is an object to be measured and 
scaled. In the results of public discussions, a compromise on national security interests 
reflects the part of a security which is agreed on by national authorities.  
 
Same as on the UN level, the EU legislation does not provide the definition of security of the 
state and community against threats to their wellbeing. The term itself has been hopelessly 
expansible, and has in fact assumed more of an international-security dimension in the global 
war on terror48 as well as conter-espionage, counter-terrorism and counter-subversion 
dimensions. This latter feature still survives in the legislation setting out the powers of the 
security service even though the anti-subversive unit of the security was wound up in 1992.49 
Global terrorism, the possible re-emergence of a cold war, and the globalisation of organised 
crime dictate the necessity. Cyberterrorism, cybercrime and cyberpornography pose major 
threats to government and society. North Korea, Burma, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Iran, 50 China,51 
Syria, Tunisia, Vietnam, Turkmenistan,52 have sought to censor by various devices the 
information that can be retrieved online. The blogosphere and Twitter have the capability to 
thwart the most restrictive of injunctions issued by courts against the press.53 Governments 
                                                 
48Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, 2002.- 
http://www.1cor.com/1315/?form_1155.replyids=489.  
49P. Birkinshaw. Freedom of Information: The Law, the Practice, and the Ideal. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 4. Ed. 2010. p 35.  
50
 N. Akhavan. Electronic Iran: The Cultural Politics of an Online Evolution.  Rutgers University Press. 2013, p 
37. 
51L. Zhou. Chinese cyber regulators are getting personal.-Business Insider 4.02.2015.  - 
http://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-cyber-regulators-are-getting-personal-2015-2?IR=T (18.04.2015). 
52Top 10 Internet-censored countries. -USA Today 5.02.2014. - 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/02/05/top-ten-internecensors/5222385/.  
53 Patrick Birkinshaw, p. 11.  
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have increasingly taken steps to prevent the transmission of „obscene” material via the 
Internet. 
 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the principle of interpreting any 
exceptions narrowly draws attention to the restrictive interpretation of the notion of “national 
security” with a requirement for Member States to refrain from intruding upon EU 
competences.54 Consequently, the concept of national security entails protection of State´s 
national values, interests and goals, means and methods preventing and reflecting internal and 
external threats, as well as the basis of organisation and principles of systems functioning to 
protect them from foreign powers.  
II. System of limitations  
1. General requirements 
 
As was noticed above, human rights, including privacy and freedom of information, are not 
absolute: they are subject to certain “formalities” or “conditions”, id est restrictions. 
Requirements for balancing competing values are prescribed by control test where any 
restriction in favour of another value should be tested under the guidance provided in relevant 
case-law for measurement of proportionality of exceptions. Interferences are only allowed 
under the strict conditions that any restriction or sanction must be ‘prescribed by law,’55 must 
have a ‘legitimate aim’ and finally and most decisively, must be ‘necessary in a democratic 
society.’  
Under Article 10 (2) of the ECHR public authorities have a mandate to interfere with freedom 
of information by way of formalities, conditions, restrictions and even penalties. Therefore, an 
interference is legitimate if it is “prescribed by law”, is pursuant to one or more of the 
legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 and is “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve 
these aims. In addition, one of the requirements of expression “prescribed by law” is the 
ability to foresee in regulation the measure concerned. A regulation is regarded as a “law” if it 
is formulated with sufficient precision to enable a person to regulate his conduct. A person 
must be able to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
                                                 
54C. Moraes. Draft Report on the US NSA surveillance programme. European Parliament. No 2013/2188(INI). 
8.01.2014, p 9. 
55In only a few cases the ECtHR came to the conclusion that the condition “prescribed by law,” - which includes 
foreseeability, precision and publicity or accessibility and which implies a minimum degree of protection against 
arbitrariness, was not fulfilled, such as in ECtHR Herczegfalvy v. Austria 10533/8324, September 1992; ECtHR 
Steel and Others v. UK 24838/94, 23 September 1998; ECtHR Hashman and Harrup v. UK, 25594/94, 25 
November 1999; ECtHR Gaweda v. Poland, 26229/9514, March 2002 and some others.  
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which a given action may entail. An appropriate advice may be applied to the person if need 
be.56  
The degree of precision depends, to a considerable extent, on the content of the instrument at 
issue, the field it is designed to cover, and the number and status of those to whom it is 
addressed.57 A law which confers a discretion, is not, in itself, inconsistent with the 
“prescribed by law” requirement, provided that the scope of the discretion and manner of its 
exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity to give adequate protection against 
arbitrariness.58 So, if extensive interpretation is not founded on any legal provision which 
clearly authorised it and is not reasonably foreseeable for the citizen, it does not meet the 
“quality of law” standard under the ECHR.59 
 
Whilst certainty is desirable, precision may bring in its train excessive rigidity, but the law 
must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. For this reason, general provisions of 
law can at times make for a better adaptation to changing circumstances than can attempts at 
detailed regulation.60 Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a 
greater or lesser extent, are vague, and whose interpretation and application are questions of 
practice.61 But the dangers inherent in prior restraints call for the most careful scrutiny.62  
Therefore, regulations on Internet matters at national levels should be able to provide a 
delineated understanding and clarity that helps to define limits for State responsibility and 
non-State actors and also to promote legal certainty. The ECHR has reiterated in this context 
that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts but rather that the ECHR is 
satisfied that provisions along with the pertinent case-law give clear guidance on proper 
behaviour.   
 
An interference must also pursue a legitimate aim in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
                                                 
56ECtHR Rekvényi v. Hungary, 25390/94, para 34; ECtHR Goussev and Marenk v. Finland, 35083/97, para 53, 
17 January 2006; ECtHR Štefanec v. the Czech Republic. 75615/01, para 44, ECtHR Delfi vs Estonia case 18 
July 2006, § 71, p 17. 
57ECtHR Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland, judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 173, p. 26, § 
68. 
58ECtHR Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 17488/90, 27 March 1996, para 31. 
59ECtHR Dzhavadov v. Russia, 30160/04, 27 September 2007, para 40.  
60ECtHR Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom, 3002/03 and 23676/03, paras 20, 21 and 38. 
61ECtHR Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, 21279/02 and 36448/02, para 41. 
62ECtHR Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, para 60. 
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disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. This list is exhaustive yet its interpretation and scope evolves 
with the case law of the courts. Moreover, the ECtHR evaluates whether the reasons adduced 
by the national authorities to justify interference, are “relevant and sufficient”. For achieving 
its aims, the ECtHR has to assure itself that the national authorities applied standards which 
are in conformity with the principles embodied in the first paragraph of right, and that they 
relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.  
 
In Delfi vs Estonia63 the rights under Article 10 of the owner of a news portal were 
excessively restricted by holding it liable for comments written by third parties. Restrictions 
related to freedom of expression are considered proportionate when they, among others, 
pursue a legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of others. In the ECHR’s view 
the fact that the actual authors were also in principle liable does not remove the legitimate aim 
of holding the news portal company liable for any damage to the reputation and rights of 
others.64 
 
There are fundamental principles concerning the question of whether an interference with 
freedom is “necessary in a democratic society”.65 Any restrictions to human rights under the 
ECHR Article 10 mechanism are connected to the requests of pluralism of views, tolerance 
and broadmindedness which serve as a cornerstones to the “democratic society”. According to  
MGN Limited v United Kingdom, necessity within the meaning of ECHR implies the 
existence of a “pressing social need”. The States have a certain margin of appreciation in 
assessing whether such need exists, but this need is operated under European supervision that 
covers both legislation and the decision applying, even those given by an independent court.66 
As regards the meaning of the adjective “necessary” in Article 10 (2), the ECtHR confirmed 
in the case of MGN Limited v United Kingdom in its judgment of 18 January 2011 that it 
“impliesthe existence of a pressing social need”. The States have a certain margin of 
appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with 
                                                 
63ECtHR Delfi AS v. Estonia, 64569/09, 10 October 2013.  
64Ibid, para 77. 
65ECtHR Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, para 46; ECtHR Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 
68416/01, para 87; ECHR Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland, 16354/06, para 48; ECHR Animal 
Defenders International v. the United Kingdom, 48876/08, para 100, 22 April 2013.  
66P. Malanczuk. Freedom of Information and Communication. -Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law. April 2011, para 50. 
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supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decision applying it, even those given by 
an independent court. 67 
The ECtHR have ruled that considered values should be treated with equal respect and that 
national authorities have to follow the requirement of fair balancing when two protected rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR are in conflict with each other in certain cases68. 
2. Privacy vs Freedom of Information 
 
When finding a proper balance for the privacy and freedom of information, as a matter of 
principle, the rights guaranteed under Articles 8 and 10 deserve equal respect as it is 
recognized that the exercise of the right to privacy is important for the realization of the right 
to freedom of information and is one of the foundations of a democratic society.69 
 
The Article 8 (2) of the ECHR sets conditions for limitations to the privacy right with the 
wording: “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others“. Article 10 (2) sets the legal conditions for the limitation of 
the freedom of information. It states: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it 
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests 
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 
 
As for the notice, the questions of the protection of public figures' reputations and freedom to 
disseminate information will be left out of scope due to the main purpose of the thesis to 
focus on privacy, free flow of information online and national security. 
                                                 
67Ibid, para 101. 
68ECtHR Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, 71111/01, para 43, 14 June 2007; ECtHR MGN Limited v. the 
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The right to privacy is justified to limits for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. Where the right to freedom of expression is being balanced against the right to respect 
for private life, the relevant criteria in the balancing exercise include the following elements: 
contribution to a debate of general interest, how well known the person concerned is, the 
subject of the report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the method of obtaining the 
information and its veracity, the content, form and consequences of the publication, and the 
severity of the sanction imposed.70 Conclusively, according to the Delfi vs Estonia and Von 
Hannover v. Germany cases of the ECHR, the relevant criteria in the balancing exercise 
include the following elements: contribution to a debate of general interest, how well known 
the person concerned is, the subject of the report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, 
the method of obtaining the information and its veracity, the content, form and consequences 
of the publication, and the severity of the sanction imposed.71 
 
Restrictions related to freedom of expression came into play in connection to rights under 
Article 8 of ECHR72 in a lively lasting debate over the right to be forgotten that has been 
contested within the jurisdiction of ECtHR. Thus, in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. V Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD)73 the ECtHR acknowledged that EU citizens have 
the right to request internet search engine Google to remove search results directly related to 
them. This assessment balanced the interest of the person making the request and the public 
interest to have access to the data by retaining it in the list results.74  
 
For the cases of reputation harm, for example if an attack on a person’s reputation has attained 
a certain level of seriousness75 and was made in a manner causing prejudice to personal 
enjoyment of the right to private life, the ECHR stated in A. v. Norway and Axel Springer AG 
v. Germany that the State authorities have a duty to strike a fair balance when protecting two 
values which may come into conflict with each other in certain cases.  
 
                                                 
70ECtHR Delfi vs Estonia, para 82; ECtHR Axel Springer AG, para § 87; ECtHR Von Hannover v. Germany . 
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 22 
Consequently, the ECtHR has established the balance for the means with which citizens 
exercise their right to defend their interests, and in Europe the search engine operators act 
under the supervision of national data protection authorities which are legally required to 
perform an independent control. This author takes the view that the tendency of the ECtHR to 
put individuals back in control by updating their data protection rights can be followed and 
that there is no ground for spreading the idea that the ECtHR allows for massive censorship76. 
3. Freedom of Information vs National security 
 
Privacy and security matters approach delicate content control regulation questions. There are 
many cases where the balance between freedom of information and national security has been 
struck, as enquirers have frequently been confronted with a number of obstacles, often with 
regard to a reluctance by the authorities to carry out their duty to investigate the facts 
adequately. Allegedly, public authorities have refused to disclose information in order to 
protect national security concerns77 or for the effectiveness of their work. Still there are cases 
where access to certain types of information is limited and even the courts have been 
reminded of their limited role when accessing questions concerning executive judgments 
involving national security.78 
 
For the balance between the freedom of information and national security, the ECtHR has 
been consistent about the relationship between civil liberties and national security. In Rehman 
v Secretary of State79 the ECtHR ruled that the individual rights prevail over national security 
interests. The concept was introduced in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner where 
the ECtHR found that the right of individuals are not subordinated to national security 
interests.  
 
Technological surveillance for security purposes in public places has become an ordinary 
incident of life in many situations, but questions may arise as to the use made of the material 
recorded. In Peck v. United Kingdom80 the distinction between the ordinary incidents of social 
living and a serious interference with respect to a person's private life in this context are 
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77F. La Rue, para 20.  
78P. Birkinshaw, p. 33.  
79ECtHR Rehman v Secretary of State,  11 October 2001.   -http://www.publications.parliament.u 
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illustrated.81 Similarly, in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner the ECtHR stated that 
human rights must prevail over national security interests. In R (B.Mohamed) v Secretary of 
State for foreign and Commonwealth Affairs82  the Divisional Court ordered disclosure of 
documents by the UK government concerning details of torture on the claimant which were 
held by the US government subject to public interest certificates which the UK government 
was asked to clarify. The US government alleged that disclosure would prejudice intelligence 
relations between the US and the UK. In Animal Defenders International v. the United 
Kingdom83,  the ECtHR has also held that when a non-governmental organisation is involved 
in matters of public interest, such as the present applicant, it is exercising a role as a 
public watchdog of similar importance to that of the press.  
 
Through these examples it became evident that, in the balance for the freedom of information 
versus national security interests, the ECtHR continue with the approach that national security 
interests can be considered as an appropriate restriction to the human right only in those cases 
where interference with human rights was justified by passing a «triple» control test of 
necessity, legitimacy and proportionality by means of lawful limitations.  
1) Hate speech and war propaganda regulation 
 
The ICCPR Article 19 does not protect speech inciting hatred, violence, and discrimination, 
and by support of Article 20 (1) and (2) of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee 
stresses that “acts addressed in Article 20 of the ICCPR, are of such an extreme nature that 
they are subject to restriction pursuant to the Article 20 (3)84.” But the fine line between those 
expressions without any seriousness set out in Article 20 (3) 85 to the acts with systematic 
intentions to impose threat to the State sovereignty has been noticed.  
 
Also, the prohibition of the “propaganda of war” under the Article 20 (1) has been addressed 
by the UN Human Rights Committee with “any propaganda for war and any advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence shall be prohibited by law”, but this provision does not prohibit advocacy of the 
                                                 
81R. Toulson. Freedom of expression and Privacy. Vol 41. Issue 2. London: 2007 (Paper presented at 
Association of Law Teachers Lord Upjohn Lecture. London. 9.02.2007), p 149.  
82Administrative Court, Decision of England and Wales High Court, Mohamed, R v Secretary of State for 
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, CO/4241/2008, 21 August 2008. 
83ECtHR Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom, 48876/08, para 103, 22 April 2013. 
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sovereign right of self-defence or the right of peoples to self-determination and independence 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations86.  
2. Restrictions on anonymity and encryption 
 
In an age of pervasive online surveillance, questions of anonymity and encryption closely 
relate to the free flow of information, privacy and national security, are not prescribed in any 
international human rights instrument. Nevertheless, the anonymity and encryption must be 
objects of the well-known three-part test: any limitation on expression must be provided for 
by law; may only be imposed for legitimate grounds; and must conform to the strict tests of 
necessity and proportionality. 
 
In fact, that anonymity has been as a safeguard and advancer to privacy, free expression, 
political accountability, and public participation in debates. There are very few States that 
provide general protection in law for anonymous expression. However, although a number of 
States exert significant pressure against anonymity offline and online, there are several States’ 
judiciaries who have protected anonymity, at least in limited instances: in 2014 the Supreme 
Court of Canada  annulled the warrantless acquisition of an anonymous online user identity87. 
 
An extensive number of laws in countries around the world promote the effective use of both 
encryption and anonymity tools. Among them are Brazil with the Marco Civil da Internet 
Law (2014), Austria with the E-Commerce Act and Telecommunication Act, and Greece, 
Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and Slovakia, as well as the United States of America, 
encourage the use of encryption.88  
 
Nonetheless, on the UN level States are urged to provide alternative recourses and other less 
intrusive means than disproportionate restrictions to freedom of information and privacy by 
the means of prohibition of anonymity and encryption. It is left up to States by which means 
to achieve solutions in a dilemma when their obligation to protect freedom of expression is in 
conflict with their obligations to prevent violations of the right to life or bodily integrity, 
which are put at risk by terrorism and other criminal behaviour. So far, the requests the 
disclosure of encrypted information through judicial warrants, by assuring that general 
                                                 
86General Comment No 11 on prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national racial or religious hatred 
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limitations on the security provided by encryption are necessary and proportionate, by 
showing publicly and transparently that other less intrusive means are unavailable, and that 
only backdoors would achieve the legitimate aim.89 The anti-anonymity laws were declared as 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea90 Both, the ECHR and 
the Court of the United States protect the right to anonymous expression.91  
 
On the other hand, there are numerous national regulations that prohibit anonymous speech 
online. Brazil, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam,92 the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Ecuador,93 and the Russian Federation published separate regulations that would require users 
to provide identification to connect to networks94. These governments around the globe are 
working to restrict methods of anonymity and are seeking to undermine these obstacles to 
surveillance, potentially making the internet less secure for everyone.95 
4. National Security vs Privacy 
 
Further, let's have a look at the balanced approach between national security and privacy. The 
Peck v. United Kingdom96 case points out the distinction between the ordinary incidents of 
social living and a serious interference with respect for a person´s privacy. The case 
emphasised that the disclosure of the images of closed-circuit television footage, which 
resulted in images of applicant being published and broadcast widely to the media, resulted in 
a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR by the reason that the applicant was in a public street but 
that he was not there for the purposes of participating in any public event, nor was he a public 
figure. The court recognised that the Council could have taken steps to obtain the applicant's 
prior consent to disclosure, it could have itself masked the images before making them 
available to the media, or it could have taken the utmost care in ensuring that the media to 
which the disclosure was made masked the images.97 The ECtHR noted that the Council did 
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not explore the first or second options and considers that the steps taken in respect of the third 
option were inadequate.98  
 
On 8 April 2014 the Court of Justice of the EU released judgment in cases Digital Rights 
Ireland and Seitlinger and Others99 where the court declared the Data Retention Directive 
invalid as it entails a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with the fundamental 
rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data, without that 
interference being limited to what is strictly necessary. The court found the directive 
interferes in a particularly serious manner with the fundamental rights to respect for private 
life and to the protection of personal data because by adopting the Data Retention Directive, 
the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of 
proportionality. Therefore, the ECtHR discovered that the directive did not ensure the 
controlled compliance required by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU European 
Union.  
 
After the examination of case law of the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the EU, it become 
clear that EU  courts give in balancing national security with the right to privacy an advantage 
to human rights with requirements of proportionality, legitimacy and necessity for restrictions 
to be applied.  
 
Regarding to the transparency and accountability of surveillance activities, the ECtHR ruled 
in R (B.Mohamed) v Secretary of State for foreign and Commonwealth Affairs100 case where 
the Divisional Court ordered disclosure of documents by the UK government concerning 
details of torture on the claimant which were held by US government subject to public interest 
certificates which the UK government was asked to clarify despite of the US government 
statement that disclosure would prejudice intelligence relations between the US and the UK. 
The freedom of information was measured against national security interests in Youth 
Initiative For Human Rights v. Serbia101 where the ECtHR concluded that the intelligence 
agency obliged to provide with certain information concerning electronic surveillance even if 
intelligence agency eventually responded that it did not hold that information, but that 
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response was unpersuasive in ECtHR has also held that when a non-governmental 
organisation is involved in matters of public interest, such as the present applicant, it is 
exercising a role as a public watchdog of similar importance to that of the press.  
 
In 2003 the ECtHR ruled102 that CCTV coverage of a man attempting suicide in a public 
place, which was shown on UK TV, was a breach of his article 8 right to privacy. In 2008 
case S. And Marper v UK103 the Court ruled that the blanket and indiscriminate retention of 
more than 857,000 records  of those not convicted or charged without regard to the time 
limits, seriousness or age breached article 8 of ECHR. These both cases prove that the ECtHR 
applies the balance for the competing rights consistently which maintains the legal certainty 
and uphold the rule of law.  
 
Through these examples it became evident that, in the balance for the freedom of information 
versus national security interests, the ECtHR continue with the approach that national security 
interests can be considered as an appropriate restriction to the human right only in those cases 
where interference with human rights was justified by passing a «triple» control test of 
necessity, legitimacy and proportionality by means of lawful limitations.  
1.Hate speech and war propaganda regulation 
 
The ICCPR Article 19 does not protect speech inciting hatred, violence, and discrimination, 
and by support of Article 20 (1) and (2) of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee 
stresses that “acts addressed in Article 20 of the ICCPR, are of such an extreme nature that 
they are subject to restriction pursuant to the Article 20 (3)104.” But the fine line between 
those expressions without any seriousness set out in Article 20 (3) 105 to the acts with 
systematic intentions to impose threat to the State sovereignty has been noticed.  
 
Also, the prohibition of the “propaganda of war” under the Article 20 (1) has been addressed 
by the UN Human Rights Committee with “any propaganda for war and any advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence shall be prohibited by law”, but this provision does not prohibit advocacy of the 
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sovereign right of self-defence or the right of peoples to self-determination and independence 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations106.  
2.Restrictions on anonymity and encryption 
 
In an age of pervasive online surveillance, questions of anonymity and encryption closely 
relate to the free flow of information, privacy and national security that are not prescribed in 
any international human rights instrument. Nevertheless, the anonymity and encryption must 
be objects of the well-known three-part test: any limitation on expression must be provided 
for by law; may only be imposed for legitimate grounds; and must conform to the strict tests 
of necessity and proportionality. 
 
In fact, that anonymity has been as a safeguard and advancer to privacy, free expression, 
political accountability, and public participation in debatesThere are very few States that 
provide general protection in law for anonymous expression. However, although a number of 
States exert significant pressure against anonymity offline and online, there are several 
States’judiciaries who have protected anonymity, at least in limited instances: in 2014 the 
Supreme Court of Canada annulled the warrantless acquisition of an anonymous online user 
identity107.  
 
An extensive number of laws in countries around the world promote the effective use of both 
encryption and anonymity tools. Among them are Brazil with the Marco Civil da Internet 
Law (2014), Austria with the E-Commerce Act and Telecommunication Act, and Greece, 
Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and Slovakia, as well as the United States of America, 
encourage the use of encryption.108  
 
Nonetheless, on the UN level States are urged to provide alternative recourses and other less 
intrusive means than disproportionate restrictions to freedom of information and privacy by 
the means of prohibition of anonymity and encryption. It is left up to States by which means 
to achieve solutions in a dilemma when their obligation to protect freedom of expression is in 
conflict with their obligations to prevent violations of the right to life or bodily integrity, 
which are put at risk by terrorism and other criminal behaviour. So far, the requests the 
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disclosure of encrypted information through judicial warrants, by demonstration that general 
limitations on the security provided by encryption are necessary and proportionate, by 
showing publicly and transparently that other less intrusive means are unavailable, and that 
only backdoors would achieve the legitimate aim.109 The anti-anonymity laws were declared 
as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea110 Both, the ECHR 
and the Court of the United States protect the right to anonymous expression.111  
 
On the other hand, there are numerous national regulations that prohibit anonymous speech 
online. Brazil, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam,112 the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Ecuador,113 and the Russian Federation published separate regulations that would require 
users to provide identification to connect to networks114. These governments around the globe 
are working to restrict methods of anonymity and are seeking to undermine these obstacles to 
surveillance, potentially making the internet less secure for everyone.115 
4. Triangular perspective 
 
For the purpose of the achieving the aim of the thesis and to introduce the considerable 
solutions in the dichotomy between judicial and political powers regarding the 
implementation of human rights online, the thesis proposes the fresh view of seeing the 
problem as a complex concept of the interrelationship of all three aspects applicable in cyber 
matters. The view deserves attention as a three-dimensional paradigm that reflects emerging 
legal matters of electronic data processing and represents reality in the most adequate way. 
The controversy between State actors of internet society, as to the question of whether it is 
possible to continue the application of the balance model according to the existing universal 
treaties in the light of changed national security needs, and the rapid development of 
information technology usage among individuals, is grounded on the three demands: the right 
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to privacy, the freedom of information, and national security. So far, the related matters have 
been seen mainly through a two-sided approach, which may not be sufficient. However it is 
not wrong to continue with the same approach has been deployed during the last decades, but 
it may leave essential elements of the reality unaddressed. The thesis has chosen the three-
dimensional approach and its argumentation is based on this point of view.  The three corners 
are not random, rather they are identified as they interrelate to each other.  
 
The legality of this view is based on the case-law of the ECtHR. For instance, in Hatton v 
United Kingdom, the ECtHR underlined that whatever analytical approach is adopted, regard 
must be had to the fair balance that had to be struck between the competing interests of the 
individuals and the community as a whole.  
 
In 2015, the UN Special Rapporteur admitted the worrying trend lines regarding security, 
freedom of information and privacy online while states fail to provide public justification to 
support restrictions.116 Rapporteur reminded to States to read the permissible limitations on 
the rights strictly117 according to all accepted rules of derogation to apply. This view is 
supported by the case The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom118, where the ECtHR confirmed 
that the restriction must be something more than “useful,” “reasonable” or “desirable”.  
 
According to the data privacy laws research in 2012, it has been revealed that the standard 
established by the European Union regulations and complementing case-law, has influenced 
the majority of the world’s countries. Because of the reason, that it originates from the legal 
standards established in the UDHR and in the ICCPR. Both follow similar approach to the 
interrelation between human rights the same logic of subordination for rights and relevant 
restrictions, legally binding on all UN Member States. 
III Midway conclusions 
 
The first chapter of thesis indicated what is the minimum scope of protection for international 
human rights, specifically for privacy and freedom of information in regards to national 
security. The nature of the right to privacy in online protection covers the protection of 
individuals against any attacks on honour and reputation, the use of a person´s name, identity, 
or likeness, without being spied upon. Protected is any activity online concerning an 
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individual´s data transmission via Internet is included to the protection of the private sphere. 
Freedom of information appears to be information to br protected regards to all kinds and 
sorts of expression and the means of their dissemination, whether spoken, written and sign 
language and non-verbal expression, shared including in the Internet. And the national 
security concept entails protection of State´s national values, its normal functioning, interests 
and goals, means and methods preventing and reflecting internal and external threats. The 
legal expectations contained in international human rights treaties for States to be respected, 
based on the case-law of the the Court of Justice and of the EU ECtHR, that considered values 
should be treated with equal respect and that national authorities have to follow the 
requirement of prevalation of rights over exceptions provisioned to balancing when two 
protected rights.  
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B Current State Practice  
I Relevant State Practice 
1. The United States 
1) Regulation  
 
The private life protection is enshrined in Article 11 (1) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (hereinafter ACHR) which is similar to the ICCPR in content. Article 13 (1) 
guarantees the right to freedom of thought and expression, including freedom of 
information119 and is also similar to the ICCPR.120  
 
Comparing to the Article 10 of the ECHR to the Article 32 of the Arab Charter, Article 9 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples´ Rights (hereinafter ACHPR), the Article 13 of 
ACHR follows the similar ideology for the liberties that are objects to the limitations to what 
is allowed within the law and are according to the “collective security” or “common interest” 
protection. The “law”  has been interpreted globally as being consistent with international 
law, specifically the aim and purpose of the UN Charter, so “international human rights 
standards must always prevail over contradictory national law”121. Thus, the common 
nominators can be drawn from the American and European Constitutions as both stand for the 
protection of internationally recognised human rights and give priority to international human 
rights even in cases where national law appear with contradiction.   
 
The US Consitution the Fourth Amendment protects all Americans against unreasonable 
searches by the government.122 Right after 9/11 in 2001, the US signed the Patriot Act that 
bypasses the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (hereinafter FISA Court) and allows 
direct spying through a new NSA electronic surveillance program.123  The FBI collected 
Americans’ communications under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(hereinafter FISA)124 without a warrant or judicial oversight. Currently, according to the Bill 
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of Rights Defense Committee, three states (Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont) and 149 cities, 
towns and counties have passed resolutions protesting provisions of the Patriot Act125. 
 
It is noteworthy, that before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States courts, since 1971, 
that the threat level is not sufficient to impose restrictions to the civil liberties. Therefore, 
there was not such a threat to the national security that would justify an infringement of the 
core values of society. For example, in the New York Times Co. v. United States126 the court 
ruled that, in attempting to suppress the Pentagon Papers, the government failed to meet the 
«heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of prior judicial restraint». So, 
before the terrorist attacks to the US, courts as well complied with the international human 
rights standards. The 9/11 terrorist attacks caused a crucial shift in the balance for privacy, 
freedom of information, and national security in the US as these accidents created the greatest 
distinction between the EU and US approach caught through idea of the “exception”.127 As a 
result, during Busch administration initiated “war on terror”, the US courts case-law started to 
decide in favour of national security interests causing the shift in the balance which was is 
seen as evasion and erosion of the rule of law.128  
 
Among other provisions, the record search provision made it possible for the FBI to secure 
client records without judicial oversight, and without prior notification of the person under 
surveillance. The accountability and oversight were not prioritised.129 Thus, the US judicial 
concept of balance moved closely to the legislative one to the completely opposite side from 
the previous position and started to contradict against the judicial balance established by the 
case-law in the ECtHR. 
2) Practice  
 
The jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court has erected strong defences of the freedom of 
speech in America. In New York Times Co v United States,130 for example, the Supreme Court 
rejected the claim of the US government that it was entitled to censure the publication by the 
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New York Times and Washington Post of the then-classified Pentagon Papers that had been 
prepared and compiled by government officials responsible for conducting the Vietnam War. 
The Supreme Court upheld the right of the editors to publish the materials on the basis of the 
constitutional guarantee of the freedom to speak and to publish as laid down in the First 
Amendment. It dismissed the claim of the Nixon administration to secure confidentiality of 
the information and denied that the government was entitled to a prior restraint order 
prohibiting publication in the first place.131 
2. The United Kingdom 
1) Regulation 
 
The contending situation within the UK escalates by the political, economical and legal 
tension arising between UK and EU. The British cases of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
(hereinafter IPT) are brought before the ECtHR, in Liberty & Others v. the Security Service, 
SIS, GCHQ and Big Brother Watch v. UK that concerns bulk data collection, data sharing, and 
Britain’s existing legislation relating to human rights,132 where the ECtHR is called upon to 
determine the issue about collection of data and provide the final word on the matter. The 
rulings of the ECtHR lay the dilemma before the UK as the upcoming decisions of the ECtHR 
will be the outcomes of the crosscontinental battle between the UK´s and EU´s legislative and 
executive powers with judicial ones and may cause far-reaching consequences for the future 
of the UK in the EU. Therefore, given its role to developments in the UK and its relations 
with its allies and partners are of continuing interest of the British government. 
 
In November 2014 the premise was affirmed by the UK Home Secretary Theresa May who 
addressed her strong view to the courts that the provisions of a Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Bill are compatible with the ECHR and should be implemented.133 On the 5th 
December 2014 the IPT in Liberty & Others v. the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ has ruled that 
Britain’s legal regime governing mass surveillance of the internet by intelligence agencies 
does not violate human rights.134 In February 2015 for the first time the IPT found that 
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GCHQ's access to information obtained by the US National Security Agency's PRISM and 
Upstream programmes was illegal.135  
 
In the UK, regulation on surveillance exists in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000 which deals with directed surveillance and intrusive surveillance which is a) carried out 
in relation to anything taking place on any residential premises or in a private vehicle, and b) 
involves the presence of an individual on the premises (such as a paid informer or someone 
who is concealed) or is carried out by means of a surveillance device. The Act is designed to 
ensure that practice in this area is brought into line with the ECHR requiring that the different 
kinds of surveillance are authorised in advance, the authorisation in some cases now requiring 
judicial approval. It still has been argued136 that, the UK lacks an impartial safeguards system 
to ensure against the abuse of such powers. 
 
In 12 February 2015, the Parliament adopted the new Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 
intended to give Britain some of the “toughest powers in the world”137 against terrorism. In 17 
July 2015 the High Court of UK ruled that the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill 
(DRIPA), a year after it was amended, is unlawful because the law fails to provide the "clear 
and precise rules" and, therefore, its sections 1 and 2 breach Articles 7 and 8 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Right before amendment of the DRIPA, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union138 decided that Data Retention Directive is invalid because of 
unspecific security measures enabled by this. DRIPA was designed to give GCHQ and other 
public intelligence authorities the power to gather and retain information on phones calls, text 
messages and online communications, and force telecommunications companies to retain data 
for 12 months.139  
 
Members of Parliament David Davis and Tom Watson challenged existing DRIPA regulation 
in High Court to be rewritten with requirement of judicial or independent approval before 
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accessing people's data. The High Court ruled that DRIPA fails to demand a warrant from a 
court or independent body. In the space of June and July 2015 two reports reflecting the new 
consensus amongst experts in the Anderson140 and RUSI reports141 came to conclusion that 
intelligence agencies be required to attain judicial sign off - rather than ministerial - for 
interception warrants. 
2) Practice  
 
The UK laws personal data have existed since 1984 and superseded by the Data Protection 
Act 1998. Before these regulations paper records were held by employers on employees had 
been stoutly resisted in spite of notorious episodes concerning abuses by self-styled private 
vetting agencies.142 In March 2009 the Information Commissioner issued a press release with 
details of a database held by a consulting company with details of 3,213 construction workers. 
Data had been sold to over forty construction companies to vet individuals for employment.143 
The possibilities involving unregulated use of genetic information amount to the implications 
of commercial patenting of such information are startling. The Department of Health sells 
information on its database that records patient reaction to pharmaceuticals.144 In 2001 the 
Metropolitan Police refused to destroy 3.500 DNA profiles taken from people questioned but 
subsequently ruled out of police investigations.145 
 
In R v Home Secretary case (1987) was ruled that Interception of Communications Act 1985 
provides a number of new safeguards to restrain any possible misuse of the new statutory 
procedures, addressing concerns that the practice of telephone tapping had been abused 
previously. In the case Halford v United Kingdom146 of the ECtHR held that the UK was in 
breach of art 8 for failing to regulate the interception of communications of employers. In 
response to new technology and new means of communication. In particular, as was held in R 
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v Effic147 case that the 1985 Act did not apply to the use of cordless phones. These issues have 
been addressed in the RIPA 2000 Part I, but after its inactment were expressed doubts 
whether new provisions are sufficiently comprehensive.148 So, it becomes obvious that the 
practice of interceptive means to the communications via electronic devises has been widely 
used by the UK, but the case-law of the ECtHR fulfilled commitment to maintain the human 
rights in compliance with the main UN international treaty bodies.  
 
While the UK is adopting tough legislation, asking for state effectiveness in protecting its 
critical infrastructure is justified. Governments have not always taken effective remedies to 
protect its important public service means. At the same time major responsibility for securing 
informational infrastructure lies with the private sector which reduces the level of 
infrastructure protection. For example, US public information systems are not 
comprehensively protected due to outdated software used in computers and the lack of 
demand for legislation to renew in a mandatory way effective protective software to grant 
protection against known viruses. Also, a low level in staff education related to protection of 
information systems was found.  
2. France  
1) Regulation  
 
The January 2015 attacks in Paris have highlighted the threat of domestic terrorism in Europe 
and put the continent on high alert. Europol announced on January 13th that an estimated 
5,000 European citizens have joined the ongoing armed conflict in Syria and pose a direct 
threat to their home countries upon their return. Some of the recently reported cases in France 
may cross the high threshold of expression that can legitimately be prosecuted.  
 
A wave of cases opened by the French judiciary over the past years against people for 
allegedly “glorifying terrorism,” some of whom have already been summarily sentenced to 
imprisonment, shows the contradictions in France’s approach to the right to express opinions 
that offend, shock, or disturb. In 21 January 2015 hackers attacked website of the France´s 
biggest newspaper Le Monde and France's measures to prevent people from defending 
terrorism have gone overboard.  
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France has ratified all the main international legal instruments on human rights in which 
freedom of opinion and expression is enshrined. Freedom of expression is expressly 
recognised in article 19 of the UDHR and in articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR. 
 
France supports the mandate of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, established in 1993. A number 
of resolutions on freedom of opinion and expression, co-sponsored by France, have been 
adopted by first the Human Rights Commission and then the Human Rights Council over the 
years, reaffirming the principle that freedom of expression is an essential freedom in a State 
under the rule of law.  
 
France also supports freedom of expression through the Council of Europe. France is subject 
to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR as regards the implementation of article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in which freedom of expression is enshrined. The Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe has also adopted the Guidelines on protecting freedom of 
expression and information in times of crisis. 
 
The arrests and prosecutions are the first to be carried out under the November 2014 
counterterrorism law. They are based on a criminal code article under which “inciting” or 
“defending” terrorism carries a sentence of up to five years in prison and a fine of EUR 
45,000, and up to seven years and a EUR 100,000 fine if it involved posting something 
online.149 While “incitement” and “defence of terrorism” were already offences in France, the 
November 2014 law moved them from the press law to the criminal code. This means the 
process can be fast-tracked by the authorities. 
 
France is committed to defending freedom of expression, including on the Internet. The 
Internet can be used, however, as a vehicle for the propaganda of hate and for material 
potentially prejudicial to public morals and health or to the security of the State. There is a 
risk that notions such as "defence of terrorism” will be used to criminalize statements made 
without the necessary element of intent and the direct and immediate likelihood that they 
would prompt such violence. French law allows for people to be sentenced to up to five years 
in prison if they commit the broadly worded offenses of “inciting” or “glorifying” terrorism. 
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As a reflection to France´s national security situation, in November 2014 France adopted the 
new counterterrorism law which legalised electronic surveillance by public bodies and 
increased the sentence to seven years if either offence is committed online. In January 2015 
France doubled down on an existing law that allows the shutdown of websites deemed to be 
«sympathizing with terror».150 
 
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 
have incorporated this issue into their investigations and recommendations. These two 
experts, alongside their counterparts at the Organisation of American States (OEA) and the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, issued a joint declaration in March 2010 
identifying ten key challenges to freedom of expression worldwide, including efforts by some 
governments to control or limit the Internet. 
2) Practice  
 
France is exercising the Internet content control practices. In Yahoo case in France illustrates 
a clash of legal cultures regarding Internet content control among democratic societies. In 
May 2000, the Paris Tribunal de grande made an interim ruling ordering Yahoo to take 
measures to make it impossible for its disputed sites and services to be accessed through 
Yahoo.com by a surfer calling from France. Yahoo’s California-based company provided 
information services on its US-based website which permitted traffic of material glorifying 
Nazism. In the US, this is protected by the First Amendment. In France, it is barred by French 
law and punishable under the French Penal Code. The Paris Tribunal based its ruling on the 
assumption, following technical expert advice, that effective filtering methods were available 
to Yahoo making it possible to block access to the Nazi material by French residents without 
removing it more generally (also for US citizens, for example). In addition to the injunction 
and the risk of financial penalties in the civil action, Yahoo as a company and its CEO were 
confronted with criminal charges, but were acquitted in a French court decision that was 
finally upheld on appeal in 2005. Yahoo responded to the injunction issued in the civil action 
by seeking a declaratory judgment in US courts that the French orders were unenforceable in 
the US. While the first ruling by a Californian District Judge agreed that the French orders 
violated public policy as laid down in the First Amendment and were therefore unenforceable 
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by a US court, in the end Ninth Circuit dismissed the Yahoo case on the basis of six strongly 
divided opinions151. 
4. The Russian Federation 
1) Regulation  
 
The compliance of the Russian Federation legislation to the standards in international human 
rights treaties has been question of divergent sides. From the one side, the Russian Federation 
strengthened its commitment to the protection of 
personal data by ratification the ECHR on 5 May 1998 Russia152 and the Council of Europe 
Convention on 15 May 2013. The Russian Federation also signed on 13 March 2006 the 
additional protocol to Coe regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flow.153 The 
Article 24 of the Russian Constitution stipulates that it is not permissible to collect, store, use 
or disseminate information about a person’s private life without his/her consent. State and 
municipal authorities must ensure that any person has access to documents and materials 
affecting his rights and freedoms, except where the law provides otherwise. Article 24, 
accompanied by the relevant federal laws, provides additional safeguards for the data 
protection pursuant to the Article 8 of the CoE. Corresponding national laws, such as the 
Communications Act of 7 July 2003 (no. 126-FZ) guarantees the privacy of postal, 
telegraphic and other forms of communication transmitted by means of telecommunications 
networks or mail services. Restrictions on the privacy of communications are permissible 
only in cases specified in federal laws (section 63(1)). The interception of communications is 
subject to prior judicial authorisation, except in cases specified in federal laws. Moreover, the 
Article 55 (3) of the Russian Constitution allows measures to interfere into private 
communications should be granted by the judicial warrants. All human rights limitations 
should be interpreted restrictively and applied only according to the provisions prescribed by 
law.154  
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2) Practice  
 
From the pratical side, the ECtHR revealed in the most recent judgment, Zakharov v. 
Russia155, on the proper limits of communications surveillance powers under Russian law that 
Russia’s SORM system, which is present in Russia and in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan156, is not consistent with the requirements of Article 8 
of the ECHR. The ECHR noted in its final verdict under following reasons: 
A) "Threat to national security" in the Russian law does not explain how such a broadly 
worded term should be interpreted in legal practice, and thus it gives law enforcement 
agencies too broad discretion determine what events or activities pose a threat to the above, 
and whether this threat is serious enough to justify the interception of telephone negotiations. 
B) Russian legislation does not clearly determine the situations in which wiretapping should 
be discontinued. The requirement for immediate cessation of listening when the need for this 
measure disappears, is found only in the Article 186 of Criminal Procedure Code, but not in 
the law on Federal Law on Investigative activity. As a result, wiretapping on the basis of the 
law of Federal Act on Investigative Activity (in particular, connection with obtaining 
information about events or actions that threaten government, military, economic, or 
environmental information Russian Security) is carried out without sufficient guarantees Port 
of abuse. 
C) Russian law allows to be stored for six months all materials collected as a result of 
wiretapping. It does not contain requirements for the immediate destruction of the materials 
that are obviously not associated with the listening purposes. In addition, the legislation does 
not stipulate in what situations the materials that have been used in a criminal trial, must be 
destroyed after the termination of this process, and in which situations they can continue to be 
stored. 
D) The procedure for issuing permits for wiretapping does not provide sufficient guarantees 
that listening will only be allowed in cases where it is necessary and justified. In particular, in 
spite of the instructions of the Constitutional court, Russian courts do not check whether there 
are grounds to suspect a person of listening to telephone conversations whose intercede law 
authorities of involvement in the crime or acts endangering national security of Russian 
Federation. The Russian courts also do not evaluate the validity and the need to listen.  
In particular, to requests for hearing telephone conversations are often attached for evidence 
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grounds for listening, and judges do not require the submission of such materials. Normally to 
obtain judicial authorization to audition law enforcement bodies is sufficient to refer to the 
availability of information on crime or actions that threaten the national security of the 
Russian Federation.  
 
In addition, the Federal Act on Investigative Activity does not contain any requirements for 
the content of any application for listening to telephone and other conversations or judicial 
permission for this audition. As a result, courts sometimes issue permits for listening to all 
mobile phone calls in the area of fulfillment crime, without specifying a particular person or 
phone number, or permission to audition without specifying the period of validity. The the 
Federal Act on Investigative Activity lets you listen to telephone and other negotiations for 48 
hours without prior judicial authorization in cases that are not urgent. This procedure does not 
provide sufficient procedural safeguards that it will only be used in cases where it is really 
justified. 
 
Finally, the ECHR came to the conclusion that the technical equipment to ensure functions of 
search operations in the telecommunication networks (SORM - 2) gives law enforcement 
agencies the technical ability to listen Mobile telephone conversations without first obtaining 
a court authorization, ie bypassing the legal procedures. Although, abuses are possible with 
any system of secret surveillance organization, their probability is particularly high in such a 
system in Russia, where the law enforcement agencies are using technical means of direct 
access to all mobile telephone calls and required to present the resolution to the audition or 
mobile operators or anyone else. With this system, the need for effective procedural 
safeguards against abuse is particularly high. 
E) Supervision over the legality of covert operative-search activities does not meet the 
requirements of the ECHR on the independence of the supervising authority, sufficient 
authority to carry out effective supervision and transparency public control. Firstly, the 
prohibition on the registration of information about controlled subscribers and other 
information relating to the interception mobile telephone conversations is making it 
impossible to identify cases of illegal wiretapping processed without court permits. Secondly, 
supervision is operated by the General Prosecutor and authorized by him/her prosecutors. 
Considering the procedure for appointing prosecutors, the ECHR experienced doubts as to 
their independence from the executive power. Moreover, the fact that the prosecutor's office 
combines the functions of the criminal prosecution and, simultaneously, of the legality plays 
supervision telephone and other conversations, gives reason to doubt in its independence. 
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Thirdly, the prosecutor's office powers of supervision over the legality of auditions is limited: 
for example, the subject of prosecutor's supervision does not include information on tactics, 
methods and means of implementation of the activities of the organs of federal security 
services. In addition, the Russian legislation does not contain demands the immediate 
destruction of the materials that have been qualified as a prosecutor resulting from illegal 
wiretapping. Fourth, the results of prosecutorial supervision are not published or made public 
in any otherwise. Finally, the Russian Government has not provided any prosecutorial 
decisions which ruled to stop the violation of the rights or take measures to restore them and 
bring the perpetrators to justice officials do not proving thus the effectiveness of prosecutorial 
supervision in practice.  
F) While the ECHR examined the effectiveness of the means of appeal to permit wiretapping 
by phone or other communications, it detected that the effectiveness of these means of appeal 
is undermined by the fact that they are only available to those who can provide proof of 
listening to their phone negotiations. In the absence of listening of telephone notification 
system negotiation or an effective opportunity to seek information about the audition, receive 
such proof is almost impossible. Thus, a person who suspects that his telephone or other 
communications are monitored, there are no effective means of appeal - one of the most 
important guarantees against abusive uses of covert surveillance techniques. Based on above, 
the ECHR held that Russian legislation does not meet the criteria of "quality of the law " and 
not able to restrict the use of covert surveillance techniques only to those cases where it is 
"necessary in a democratic society". 
 
The Russian Constitution stipulates that it is not permissible to collect, store, use or 
disseminate information about a person’s private life without his/her consent. State and 
municipal authorities must ensure that any person has access to documents and materials 
affecting his rights and freedoms, except where the law provides otherwise (Article 24).  
 
The Communications Act of 7 July 2003 (no. 126-FZ) guarantees the privacy of postal, 
telegraphic and other forms of communication transmitted by means of telecommunications 
networks or mail services. Restrictions on the privacy of communications are permissible 
only in cases specified in federal laws (section 63(1)). The interception of communications is 
subject to prior judicial authorisation, except in cases specified in federal laws (section 63(3)). 
Thus, Russian law prohibited maintaining records of interception. 
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The ECHR noted that supervision of interception by judges and prosecutors was limited and 
not open to public scrutiny. The absence of a requirement to notify the subject when 
surveillance had ceased further undermined the effectiveness of any available remedies.   
Consequently, Russia’s SORM system was found violating the right to privacy enshrined in 
Article 8 of the ECHR. 
 
Moreover, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU) held on the 
retention of communications data after the uncertainty that has followed invalidation of the 
EU Data Retention Directive, in the Digital Rights Ireland157 case, that Russian law was seen 
to give judges too much discretion to decide whether data should be stored after the 
conclusion of criminal proceedings.  
5. China 
1) Regulation  
 
At the Spring 2016, China is not bound to the specific provisions of the ICCPR, but as a 
signatory State, has the obligation to act in good faith and not defeat the purpose of the 
ICCPR according to the customary international law.158 On the international community level, 
China continues to insist that human rights should be implemented according to a country’s 
national conditions.159  
 
As a result of Chinese specific view regards to the international law obligations, the 
implementation of data protection standards in China proceeds with Chinese characteristics. 
Currently, data protection and privacy regulations in online context might be considered as 
the most extensive and restrictive in the world.160 The Chinese concept of cybersecurity 
involves four main principles: security of cyberspace sovereignty, security of Internet 
information, security of privacy in cyberspace, and security of information technology.161 
From these four perspectives the national legislation on data protection within context of 
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national security should be observed. In 2012, the new rules were approved to strengthen the 
legal basis for real-name registration by websites and service providers by Chinese public 
authorities. Since November 2014, the new counterterrorism law required to provide 
“backdoor” access and copies of encryption keys to all telecommunications companies and 
internet services to the government.162 The registration of real- names is mandatory and the 
rules offer no protection against law enforcement requests for these records.163 
 
Current developments in Chinese electronic data protection legislation are progressive. For 
the purpose of encountering emerging threats, in 2015, China adopted an extensive National 
Security Law with an expansive definition of national security.164 According to Article 34 and 
35of the China’s Draft Cybersecurity Law, China ISPs are required to meet their legal 
obligation to protect personal information under the legality, legitimacy and necessity 
principles. They are also required to adopt measures necessary to keep the personal 
information collected strictly confidential (Article 36). An individual has the right to request 
the deletion of his or her personal information collected or used by the ISPs (Article 37).  
 
Also, nobody is allowed to acquire or disclose the personal information of others in an illegal 
manner (Article 38). Government authorities must not disclose any personal information 
obtained while performing their duties (Article 39). As for censorship measures, ISPs are 
obligated to stop the spread of information prohibited by law (Articles 40 and 41) and to set 
rules for handling complaints on Internet information (Article 42). The public offices are 
empowered to order ISPs to block the transmission of such illegal information (Article 43). 
All these provisions has raised doubts among to scholars165 that the law is not really meant to 
protect cyberspace privacy, rather, is intended to carry out Internet censorship under the 
pretext of privacy protection. 
 
In sum, it is beneficial route for China to abstain from binding obligations under international 
regards to the blocking access to online material as it is subject to the highest level of 
scrutiny, with a burden on the government to demonstrate that censorship would effectively 
avert a threat of irreparable, imminent, and weighty harm, and that less extreme measures are 
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unavailable as alternatives to protect the state interest at issue. At present, it seems apparent 
that China engages in no such scrutiny, and instead continues with censors an immense 
amount of material.  
2) Practice  
 
In 2011, China was ranked as a country with the most aggressive Internet censorship system 
where citizens are sentenced in prison sentences for writing about politically sensitive topics 
online.166 In this regard, the UN Special Rapporteur takes the position that Internet users 
confidence and security on the Internet is undermined in China and in the Republic of Korea. 
Therefore, the free flow of information and ideas online is impeded as States and private 
actors have access to new technologies to monitor and collect information about individuals 
communications and activities.  
 
Unfortunately, Asian region (Hong Kong, China) maintains abuse of human rights despite 
internationally recognized standards as there is not an obligation to abide by the laws of 
others. For example, China still practices its despotic politics and in order to gain a bigger 
stake in the Chinese market betraying the interests of its customers is inevitable.167 
 
Chinese state behaviour, for example, shows an unwavering commitment to curtailing internet 
freedom in the name of state security. The internet restrictions documented in 2013 were 
faster and more nuanced than ever before.168 They tightered controls on content, measures to 
deliberately slow internet traffic, and intensified harassment of dissidents, as the Chinese 
Communist party’s propaganda and security agencies worked to eliminate any nascent 
political challenge,169  leaves a growing community vulnerable to invasive rights violations.170 
Chinese manifest in the phrase “internet sovereignty,” meaning the right to practice 
censorship within Chinese borders.171 Violations of users rights are proven by governmental 
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activity to sentence people in a closed trial to eight years in jail for discussing democracy 
online.172 
 
Despite of universal principles China concerning to the right to privacy is overseeing the fact 
that prior censorship in particular is severely disfavored in international law, and not 
permitted in many constitutional systems. Chinese regulations undercut the right to privacy of 
Chinese web users.173 By requiring ISPs to maintain the capability to read the 
communications of individuals communicating online, and even to be able to keep records of 
which websites individual netizens choose to visit, the Chinese government is seriously 
infringing on the privacy rights of its own people.174 Although the Chinese constitution 
explicitly protects the right to free expression, theright to privacy, and the right to engage in 
academic research, the constitution itself isnot directly enforceable, and therefore regulations 
that clearly violate these rights escapeany form of judicial scrutiny.175 The overall institutional 
weakness and lack of independence of Chinese courts also plays a key role. Because most 
courts in China receive the majority of their funding from the local government,they are often 
unable or unwilling to deliver a verdict contrary to the local expectations, especially in 
politically sensitive cases. Courts are also subject to both government and Communist Party 
authority, and must please both masters.176 Similarly to right to information states consider 
approaches related to right to privacy.  
 
II Reasons for States Practice 
 
This section indends to identify if any contradiction are met, what are the reasons that States 
used to justify practise online security measures contrary to the international treaties. In the 
case, when these reasons can be solved by international law measures, the thesis will consider 
possible recommendations on potential detailed solutions for achieve consistency and 
coherence of State practices for maintaining the unity and clarity of the most national 
regulations.  
 
As was noticed earlier regards to the States under the focus, except for the China, there is the 
gap between their political order and internationally accepted standards states have been 
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committed by international treaty bodies. China is appearing as an exception because China 
has not ratified the ICCPR nor any other international law instrument that would be applicable 
to the balance of privacy, freedom of information and national security. In this section reasons 
for this incoherence will be discussed and revealed.  
 
One of the reasons why the balances established in the US and the EU Member States courts 
case-law differ substantially is that the EU States are not engaged in military action on the 
same scale as the US that has its corresponding legal and administrative policy 
developments.177 The involvement of US entailed its effective ability to protect its nation 
against any threats against national security, including cyber threats. The EU as a region is not 
involved into military operations and therefore its case-law correspond to the needs of defence 
justification. By this, this reason can be solved by international law measures. 
 
Apparently, one of the reasons that cause disharmony between judicial and political views on 
the balance between human rights and national security, is questionable ability of 
international treaties to adjust to modern-day threats to national security. Social reality 
changed the way that it is not compatible with the protection scope of treaty that drafters of 
international law treaties were not able to foresee.178 Rapid development of computing 
technology has accelerated change in social behaviour and attitudes so States have considered 
restrictions of human rights in Internet in order to meet modern threats to national security. 
Individuals become more comfortable with being connected to the Internet at all times. 
Movement toward more natural human-computer interfaces is driven by the acceptance of 
wearable Internet nodes179. A variety of forces- personal, corporate, and economic- widened 
channels to the consumer technology market, so it became widely adopted and customised in 
society. And now constant change in technology development according to Moore´s law 
enables significantly more powerful devices for a more great percentage of the world 
population.180 The trend addresses the growing dependency on information and 
communications technologies in all domains of human life181 and is moving toward more 
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deeply integrated mobile computing growth worldwide182. Thus, the change of privacy 
attitudes that we have come to expect on computers (phones, at homes, or even bodies) is not 
due to huge government programs designed to spy. Instead, this change has occurred with 
new, comfortable and convenient technology that enables the advantages of infinite 
knowledge at person´s fingertips and constant connection to Internet.183 This reason can be 
solved by relative legislation that may bring along change in individuals behaviour.  
 
Moreover, the justifications by states presented another reason for distancing from the 
universal treaty requirements, it is that the UDHR is not legally binding and that the 
signatories of the treaty who had an «unprecedented number of reservations, understanding, 
and declarations» rendered the treaty powerless under domestic law.  
 
Much of this discussion tilted to the question of power over advantages related to electronic 
data possession and processing. The electronic data became valuable asset, facilitator of 
economic growth184 and enhancer of diplomatic negotiations. From the economic point, 
surveillance practices provide insight into other countries economic policy or behaviour 
which could affect global markets.185 From a military perspective, the possession of 
surveillance assets provides the confidence to adequately assess the capabilities of a potential 
partner over time.186 And finally, spying on the UN, European Union (hereinafter EU), the 
European Parliament, the G20 summit, the Vatican, and world leaders is aimed at gaining 
advantage in diplomatic negotiations.187 These reasons ground the view that there are no 
better alternatives in the current digitized world  for progressive states (United States 
(hereinafter US), United Kingdom (hereinafter UK), Canada) to effectively protect country’s 
sovereignty than by advancing defence capacities of information technology and 
corresponding national legislation. These reasons do not serve that much to justify allowing 
interception to every individual and to set up a standard of overall intrusion of the right to 
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privacy and freedom of information. Merely, covert activity of secret intelligence services has 
been present without any depending on terrorism or crime prevention justifications. 
 
III Midway conclusions 
 
Moreover, the electronic data aggregation facilitates counter-terrorism strategies which have a 
purpose to engage “control”-risk management in response to the treat of terrorism.188 For this 
reason data aggregation and processing is usually managed by the intelligence agencies 
governed by governments, where supervision of interception by judges and prosecutors is 
limited and not open to public scrutiny. Much the same, the absence of requirement to notify 
the subject when surveillance had ceased further undermined the effectiveness of any 
available remedies against violations by the intelligence services. Also, private internet 
service providers usually manage under cooperation with state officials secretly to hand over a 
complex and often relatively complete «digital dossier»189 of individuals as was evidenced in 
the Apple case when it was occasionally caught sharing a year’s worth of location data on 
every user’s iPhone with state officials.190 These sorts of revelations are rarely met as they 
need to unified forces by individuals or organisations to be able to prove facts in order to 
protect rights in court procedure. Based on above, in order to shift the position of scales back 
to position which has been set for the international human rights treaties, an equally powerful 
response to the intrusive activities should be in place. Conclusively, there is a variety of 
reasons under which States prefer not to comply with the legal standards agreed after the 
Second World War.  
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C Future International Standard Set  
I Democracy at stake  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide relevant recommendations on the potential balance. 
If these reasons that produced the opposing balances can be solved by means of international 
law, the thesis proposes recommendations on potential solutions to achieve unity and clarity 
of balances for the rights and national security to be considered as relevant standards for 
future practice. 
 
Setting the proposals for a level at which it is comfortable for States to implement the laws, 
and human rights will not be jeopardised, is part of a current wider task of society. Rules 
established for what businesses and police can see and what processes are required for them to 
move beyond their basic level of access, serves future avoidance of the infringement of 
privacy.191 Yet, while Payton and Claupoole hold an opinion that there is no expectation for 
businesses to hold back from taking full advantage of all the resources available to companies 
for profit and competitive advantage, they guess that Sun Microsystems CEO Sott McNealy 
saying "You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it” is self-serving for technology executive 
who would like to remove all barriers to gathering data.192 Thus, the statement cannot be 
accepted as an impartial solution that meets interests and needs for the internet society as a 
whole or contributes to the sustainable legal order. At the same time in the US where business 
limits are clear, companies tend to stay within the lines of a business-centered approach.  
 
Yet, laws have limits, and therefore cannot alone solve all the problems of privacy, freedom 
of information and national security. A constitutional guarantee alone cannot ensure 
meaningful exercise of rights in practice. If we do not have a practice that is supported by 
legal culture that is supportive of civil liberties, we cannot have civil liberties.193 For that 
reason, some companies embody the insight that users should be in meaningful control of 
how their personal information is used and that transparency by commercial actors promotes 
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accountability and deters wrongdoing.194 A leader in these efforts is the non-profit Mozilla 
Corporation and its mission, alongside the Firefox browser, is to respect the privacy195 
enshrined in European legal instruments.  
 
At the same time, there are views that support the complex solutions approach that is 
complemented by multitasked components. Jack Balkin believes that decisions for regulated 
future196 will not occur from constitutional laws, rather, they will be decisions about 
technological design, legislative and administrative regulations, the formation of new business 
models, and the collective activities of end-users.197 
 
II Recommendations for Solutions 
 
Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be 
able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Thus, the thesis supports that general 
provisions of law can at times make for a better adaptation to changing circumstances than 
can attempts at detailed regulation.198 Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in 
terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague, and whose interpretation and application 
are questions of practice.199 But the dangers inherent in prior restraints call for the most 
careful scrutiny.200  
 
From the same viewpoint the recent EU developments in the field of counter-terrorism laws 
have revealed that the implementation of laws with regards to national security purposes tend 
to hold in favour of restricted interpretation. Thus, the European Commission's proposal, 
issued on 2 December 2015, argued that the EU Directive on combating terrorism does not 
meet adequate level of fundamental rights standards as it extends the scope of criminal law 
too far, for example, penalizing the receiving of training for terrorism by attending a training 
camp run by a terrorist association or group through various electronic media, including 
                                                 
194
 Ibid, p 182. 
195Ibid, p 182. 
196J. Balkin. The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age. -Pepperdine Law Review. No 101. 2008. Cited in: 
M. Price, S. Verhulst, L. Morgan. Routledge Handbook of Media Law. Routledge. 2013, p 435.  
197N. Richards. Intellectual Property: Rethinking civil liberties in the Digital Age, p 183. 
198Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom, nos.3002/03 and 23676/03, §§ 20, 21 and 38, ECHR 2009, 
where the “Internet publication rule” relied on a rule originally dating from the year 1849, and Editorial Board 
of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, no. 33014/05, §§ 60-68, ECHR 2011 (extracts), where the lack of 
reference to Internet publications in the otherwise quite detailed media law gave rise to an issue of lawfulness 
under Article 10 of the Convention. 
199Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 41, ECHR 2007-IV. 
200Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 216, p. 30, § 60. 
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through the Internet.201 This positions led to the need of the more balanced view with 
objective and impartial solutions on future interpretations.  
 
Therefore, the thesis sees that regulation for Internet matters should be construed as strict 
concepts partly due to political reasoning. Rather, compliance to the “quality of law” standard 
can be achieved by working out precise dominating concepts of primary institutions, 
responsibility sharing and guarantees related to such concepts as critical infrastructure and 
super-critical infrasture, armed conflict etc. Declaring these concepts in international political 
meetings is not mandatory, but elaborating and regulating them helps to draw clear lines 
within a country.  Delineated understanding and clearness helps to define the range of state 
responsibility and promote legal certainty as the ECHR reiterates in this context that it is not 
its task to take the place of the domestic courts. The ECHR is satisfied that provisions along 
with the pertinent case-law should make clear the consequences of different chosen 
behaviours. 
 
The thesis recommends that depending on the national legal traditions and structures 
dedicated to national security arrangements, the scope of the national security exemption must 
be clarified. The Working Party (hereinafter WP 29) suggested in three WP 29 opinions202 
that the clear definition of the concept of national security should be adopted by the European 
legislature, as it is not conclusive in the case law of the European courts. Therefore, a wide 
diversity of oversight models should be harmonised, to reduce disparity of the national legal 
traditions and structures dedicated to national security arrangements. While considering all 
remedies, the internal national security threats and external (foreign) national security threats 
should be addressed, to specify different responsibilities, civilian (Ministry of Interior or 
Justice) and military (Ministry of Defence). Thus, restrictions to the fundamental rights of all 
citizens need to be exercised according to a strict necessity and proportionality test which is a 
prerogative of a democratic society. 
 
Additionally, the thesis urges to respect the data protection principles on the protection of 
personal data, usually included in the national constitutions of the Member States, by the 
intelligence services and thus by States, who are themselves bound with treaty obligations. 
Following the Snowden revelations, the thesis draws to attention that the borders of legality 
                                                 
201Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. 2015/0281 (COD). Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/legislative 
documents/docs/20151202_directive_on_combatting_terrorism_en.pdf. 
202No 14/EN WP 228,  14/EN WP 220 and 819/14/EN WP 215. 
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have been reached and even crossed since surveillance programmes are likely to exist in all 
parts of the world that may not be traceable and public authorities may have no sight of a 
coherent and consistent application of the data protection principles following the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Council of Europe Convention 108. On the other hand, this 
view should be considered carefully as it may not have a significant effect because public 
authorities might be more concerned with the secret intelligence services than with violating 
the rights of citizens and breaching state level obligations. While constantising a fact, 
governments should have serious intention to carry out actions to protect its citizens but rather 
to follow their political interests. In the divide between citizens and governments, citizens are 
troubling governments in fulfilling their legal obligations. 
 
As a result, the thesis proposes to consider that implementation of the existing international 
standards with the additional protocol of Article 17 of the ICCPR. This suggestion is also 
supported by the EU Working Party WP29, that supposes that existing international 
agreements would grant adequate data protection safeguards to individuals when intelligence 
activities are carried out because: a) the interpretation of existing international treaties with 
the additional protocol of Article 17 of the ICCPR are able to support the global instruments 
providing for enforceable, high level privacy and data protection principles at time before the 
new global instrument will be accorded, and b) the convincing development of a global 
instrument providing for enforceable, high level privacy and data protection principles is 
necessary in order to fully address specific criteria settled for restrictions in a way that there 
are any violations related to surveillance of electronic communications for intelligence and 
national security purposes. As long as there is no relevant specified treaty, it cannot be said in 
a convincing manner that there are inter-State violations related to surveillance of electronic 
communications for intelligence and national security purposes.  
 
III Proposed balance project for the future  
  
A further suggestion on the potential additional protocol of Article 17 of the ICCPR will be 
introduced:  
 
“Being fully aware of the already widespread and constantly increasing use of electronic data 
processing systems for records of personal data on individuals;  
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Recognising that, in order to prevent abuses in the storing, processing and dissemination of 
personal information by means of electronic data banks in the private sector, legislative 
measures may have to be taken in order to protect individuals;  
 
Considering that it is urgent, pending the possible elaboration of an international agreement, 
at once to take steps to prevent further divergencies between the laws of member States in this 
field;  
 
Having regard to Resolution on the protection of privacy in view of the increasing 
compilation of personal data into computers, adopted by the seventh Conference of European 
Ministers of Justice,  
 
Recommends the governments of member States:  
 
(a) to take all steps which they consider necessary to give effect to the principles set out in the 
Annex to this resolution;  
(b) to inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, in due course, of any action 
taken in this field. 
 
The following principles apply to personal information stored in electronic data banks in the 
public and private sector. For the purposes of this resolution, the term "personal information" 
means information relating to individuals (physical persons), and the term "electronic data 
bank" means any electronic data processing system which is used to handle personal 
information and to disseminate such information.  
 
1. The information stored should be accurate and should be kept up to date. In general, 
information relating to the intimate private life of persons or information which might lead to 
unfair discrimination should not be recorded or, if recorded, should not be disseminated.  
 
2. The information should be appropriate and relevant with regard to the purpose for which it 
has been stored.  
 
3. The information should not be obtained by fraudulent or unfair means.  
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4. Rules should be laid down to specify the periods beyond which certain categories of 
information should no longer be kept or used.  
 
5. Without appropriate authorisation, information should not be used for purposes other than 
those for which it has been stored, nor communicated to third parties.  
 
6. As a general rule, the person concerned should have the right to know the information 
stored about him, the purpose for which it has been recorded, and particulars of each release 
of this information.  
 
7. Every care should be taken to correct inaccurate information and to erase obsolete 
information or information obtained in an unlawful way.  
 
8. Precautions should be taken against any abuse or misuse of information. Electronic data 
banks should be equipped with security systems which bar access to the data held by them to 
persons not entitled to obtain such information, and which provide for the detection of 
misdirections of information, whether intentional or not.  
 
9. Access to the information stored should be confined to persons who have a valid reason to 
know it. The operating staff of electronic data banks should be bound by rules of conduct 
aimed at preventing the misuse of data and, in particular, by rules of professional secrecy.  
 
10. Statistical data should be released only in aggregate form and in such a way that it is 
impossible to link the information to a particular person.”  
 
Further recommendations on the system for judicial warrants are indicated. In other countries 
judicial interventions take place at the point of granting the warrant: it is common practice for 
warrants to be granted by judges rather than by politicians. We might consider adopting 
judicial authorization rather than judicial supervision to grant a greater safeguard for the 
individual. For example no-one would think that a minister should issue interception warrants. 
Also it is not clear why the current practice of an after event audit is better than a system of 
proper interrogation by a judge before a warrant is issued.203 This way the tribunal is 
protected by any judicial review of its decisions, including decisions as to jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
203A. Bradley, K. Ewing, C.Knight. Constitutional and Administrative Law. 16.Ed. Pearson 2015, p. 429. 
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The grounds for lawful authority are suggested as: 
• The first option for lawful authority is where both sender and recipient consent to the 
interception. An example is in R v Rasool,204 with the recording of a kidnapper 
telephoning in order to identify or trace the kidnapper. The operation is authorized as 
surveillance rather than by means of an interception warrant under relevant law.  
• The second option of lawful interception takes place without any consent of either 
sender or the recipient by an undercover agent whose activities have been authorized 
under the specific legal ground which gives statutory authority for interception 
without a warrant to certain communications intercepted for specific reasons widely 
agreed in order to maintain public and private well-being, including under prison 
rules205, in high-security psychiatric hospitals; and in specific crime investigation.  
• The third basis for interception is with the authority of a warrant issued by the highest 
impartial authority whose responsibility is to provide a legally grounded warrant. 
There are three grounds for the issuing of a warrant: the interests of national security, 
the prevention or detection of a serious crime, and to give effect to an international 
mutual assistance agreement. According to the government, the request ”would have 
to satisfy the law of the requesting country as well as national interception law”. But 
that may not amount to much in practice if the law of the requesting country has few 
protections for foreign nationals (as where it is information about a national citizen 
that is required). The conduct authorized by the warrant must be proportionate to the 
end to be achieved, and before a warrant is granted consideration should take place to 
find if there is any other means to obtain information.  
 
Flexibility of legal provisions, especially in international legal treaties, is welcome as then law 
can meet the larger scope of life incidents, as well it provides for law breathing space while it 
evolves with changing times and occasions.   
 
The suggested propositions support establishing the “quality of law” standard as they 
encourage working out precise dominating concepts of primary institutions, responsibility 
sharing and guarantees related to such concepts as critical infrastructure and super-critical 
infrastructure, armed conflict. Thus, these recommendations delineate precise understanding 
and clearness that further help to define the range of state responsibility and promote legal 
certainty.  
                                                 
204R v Rasool, 1 WLR 1092 523, 1997.  
205R v Owen (1999) 1 WLR 949.  
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It is seen that by accepting the proposed recommendations States will probably be more 
willing to meet the internationally binding standards if they have clear lines and 
accompanying enforcement mechanisms to sufficiently meet the internal and external national 
security threats. It is inevitable that the application of restrictions be exercised according to a 
strict necessity and proportionality test which is fundamental prerequisite of a democratic 
society.  
 
By emphasizing the precondition of respect for the national constitutions on the data 
protection principles by intelligence services and thus by States to meet the obligation to act 
in good faith and not defeat the purpose of the ICCPR according to the customary 
international law.  
 
As a result, the support of the implementation of the existing international standards with the 
additional protocol of Article 17 of the ICCPR might discipline States to provide adequate 
data protection safeguards for individuals meanwhile intelligence activities carry out their 
duties. Support favoring the global instruments will introduce the standard for privacy, 
freedom of information, and data protection principles which should not offer less protection 
online than they have protection offline.  Accordingly, a treaty with specified provisions 
would ease implementation of globally agreed international standards, so diminish the threat 
of inter-state violations related to surveillance of electronic communications for intelligence 
and decrease possibility to attach State responsibility for operations necessary in national 
security protection.  
While society might have a justifiable expectation for the protection and implementation of 
human rights at least to a minimum extent, it is essential to guarantee that the balance set by 
international human rights treaties will not be jeopardized, rather supported for the benefits of 
economical and social development, and equally for those who have an expectation for a free 
Internet society, and equally for those who believe that proliferation of data exchange on the 
Internet should be subject to justified limitations. Both views deserve equal respect and 
therefore it might be fully admitted that solutions for the future regulation206 will be decisions 
about technological design, legislative and administrative regulations, the formation of new 
business models, and the collective activities of end-users. 
                                                 
206
 Jack Balkin. The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age. -Pepperdine Law Review. No 101. 2008. Cited 
in: M. Price, S. Verhulst, L. Morgan. Routledge Handbook of Media Law. Routledge. 2013, p. 435.  
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While surveillance is used in security purposes, it is found that surveillance is not an 
absolutely effective tool in crime investigation as it was found that cameras cannot catch 
important facts important for investigation. For example robbers find places where cameras 
are turned other direction or commit to crime behind the corners or find another ways. Also in 
practice not so many people had chance to get security from crimes because of for example 
CCTV cameras. This way we find that massive surveillance is not justified as absolutely 
effective, but only as a supportive remedy in crime handling.  The same logic could be 
followed with national security interests and terrorists investigation means where individuals 
are uncertain about how given powers will be used.”  
Conclusions   
 
After terror attacks several States faced the paradigm shift for the balance of privacy and 
national security, similarly that in the US after 9/11 in 2001. Yet, the doctrine of 
“securitization” presents serious opposition to the existing balance established by the courts in 
the EU which fuels opposite views in the European and American balances between human 
rights and national security interests. The thesis indicated that there is an absence of a shared 
vision on the future of legitimate limitations of human rights in favor of national security 
interests that has resulted in a polar dichotomy between judicial, legislative and executive 
powers within European States. This trend inevitably endangers the existing understanding of 
democracy and the rule of law.  
 
Apparently, the balance of rights has a dynamic character and is mainly affected by the 
volatile contextual framework of interests. All three notions involved in the discussion, the 
right to privacy, freedom of information, and national security, entail non-definable 
denominators which change context, but have a core essence which can be implemented in a 
technical environment such as the Internet. But, the core essence of  international human 
rights is applicable to online environment as well. Thus, there is a variety of elements that 
affects the position of the values on scales.  
 
The thesis introduces the fresh view of seeing the problem as a complex concept of the 
interrelationship of all three aspects applicable in cyber-matters as a three-dimensional 
paradigm that reflects emerging legal matters of electronic data processing and represents 
reality in the most adequate way. So far, the related matters have been seen mainly through a 
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two-sided approach, which may not be sufficient and may leave essential elements of the 
reality misaddressed.  
 
The main question during the research was how to find a balance between the parallel 
demands of privacy, freedom of security, and national security in existing international legal 
instruments so that States would more likely follow them. Currently in the absence of a 
specific international treaty or convention, there are still common denominators for the right 
to privacy in online. If the right covers any activity concerning an individual´s data 
transmission via Internet the protection is included in the protection of the private sphere. For 
the protection of the freedom of information, the protection covers all kinds and sorts of 
expression and the means of their dissemination, even those that offend, shock, or disturb are 
also protected on the Internet. National security is perceived mostly as security from foreign 
powers, not from internal threats, and especially not from home-grown internal threats. Thus, 
it is possible to apply an approach to human rights online that is similar to that applicable 
offline.  
 
For the achieved results on the balance set for the European region, ECtHR case-law 
emphasizes persistently: priority is given to national security interests only in those cases 
where interference with human rights was justified by passing a «triple» control test of 
necessity, legitimacy and proportionality by means of lawful limitations. Moreover, it has 
been indicated that this «European standard» of balance has exerted an influence on the 
majority of the world’s countries, although it originated from the universal legal standards 
established in the UDHR and thus serves as a universal lawful standard enshrined in the 
universal human rights treaties. With regards to the balance between privacy and freedom of 
information, it can be concluded that the tendency of the ECtHR is to put individuals back in 
control by updating their data protection rights can be followed and that there is no ground for 
spreading the idea that the ECtHR allows for massive censorship. 
 
While the thesis examined the balance of rights focused at an international level, several 
national regulations revealed divergent regional implementations of international standards  
and interpreted them in an incoherent manner. Through systematic analysis of the current 
practices of the most influential States and regions, such as those of the permanent members 
of the UN Security Council, the US, the UK, Russia, China, and France, we have shown that 
contradictions were still present. 
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In the US a noteworthy change in State practice was present. The 9/11 terrorist attacks caused 
a crucial shift in the balance for privacy, freedom of information, and national security in the 
US as these incidents created the greatest distinction between the EU and US approach caught 
through idea of the “exception”. Before the terrorist attacks to the US, their courts complied 
with the international human rights standards, but the 9/11 terrorist attacks imposed such a 
level of threat and gravity that it created the greatest distinction between the EU and US 
approach expressed through idea of the “exception”. As a result, during the Bush 
administration initiated “war on terror”, the US courts case-law started to decide in favour of 
national security interests causing the shift in the balance which was is seen as evasion and 
erosion of the rule of law.  
 
Therefore it might be concluded that States have grouped into territorial collective unities 
with homogeneous solutions to handle new threats. While the UK adopted tough legislation 
intended to benefit State effectiveness in protecting its national security, a similar paradigm 
shift in the conceptualization of privacy and national security after 9/11 in 2001 in the US 
seems to have resulted in the UK following 7/7 in 2005. Before the terror incidents the case-
law of the UK courts was designed to ensure that practices in surveillance were brought into 
line with the ECHR requirement that the different kinds of surveillance be authorized in 
advance and with judicial approval. The new Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
allowed the interception of connection and intensely challenged in the UK without any prior 
judicial warrant. Under these provisions, the balance of privacy, freedom of information, and 
national security that is now present in US has already taken place in UK case-law. Therefore, 
the upcoming decisions of the ECtHR are to show the results of the cross-continental battle 
between legislative and executive powers with judicial ones. 
 
The French adopted a new counter-terrorism law which legalized electronic surveillance by 
public bodies and increased the sentence to seven years if an offense is committed online. In 
January 2015 France doubled down on an existing law that allows the shutdown of websites 
deemed to be «sympathizing with terror». Thus, France has also implemented an 
interpretation of existing international instruments in favor of national security interests.  
 
Similarly, Russia has contributed to the list of States that have decided to choose national 
security interests over the protection of human rights in cyberspace. Despite the proper limits 
of communications surveillance powers under Russian law, Russia’s State practice with the 
SORM system, which is present in Russia and other post-Soviet countries, is not consistent 
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with the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR. Thus, Russia is one country that sits between 
the  contradictory approaches of Europe and those, like Brazil, that are willing to save their 
political autonomy and protect human rights  in the digital sphere according to the 'offline' 
human rights treaties.  
 
As a result of China's specific attitude towards international law obligations, the 
implementation of data protection standards in China proceeds with distinctly Chinese 
characteristics where the perspective on national legislation on data protection is strongly 
tilted towards national security interests. Currently, data protection and privacy regulations in 
the online context might be considered as the most extensive and restrictive in the world.  
 
The thesis revealed the reasons that States used to justify practicing online security measures 
contrary to the international treaties. These reasons could be solved by international law 
measures. 
 
Among other provisions, the record search provision in the US made it possible for the FBI to 
secure client records without judicial oversight, and without prior notification of the person 
under surveillance. The accountability and oversight were not prioritized.207 Thus, the US 
judicial concept of balance moved close to the legislative one - the completely opposite side 
from the previous position - and started to contradict the judicial balance established by the 
case-law in the ECtHR. 
 
For the purpose of reducing the existing wide diversity of oversight models, the thesis 
recommends clarifying the scope of the national security exemption. So, the clear definition 
of the concept of national security should be adopted and the wide diversity of oversight 
models should be harmonized, to reduce disparity of the national legal traditions and 
structures dedicated to national security arrangements. The thesis proposes that restrictions to 
the fundamental rights of all citizens need to be exercised according to a strict necessity and 
proportionality test which is a prerogative of a democratic society. 
 
As the dangers inherent in prior restraints call for the most careful scrutiny, the thesis supports 
the notion that general provisions of law can at times make for a better adaptation to changing 
circumstances than can detailed regulation. From the same viewpoint the recent EU 
                                                 
207D. McLeod, D. Shah.  News Frames and National Security: Covering Big Brother. New York: Cambridge 
University Press 2015, p 1, 2. 
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developments in the field of counter-terrorism laws have revealed that the implementation of 
laws with regards to national security purposes tend to hold in favour of restricted 
interpretation.  
 
The thesis proposes recommendations on potential solutions to achieve unity and clarity of 
balances for the rights and national security to be considered as relevant standards for future 
practice.  
 
The thesis sees that the regulation of Internet matters should be construed as strict concepts 
partly affected by political reasoning. Rather, compliance to the “quality of law” standard can 
be achieved by working out precise dominating concepts of the primary institutions, 
responsibility sharing, and guarantees related to such concepts as critical infrastructure and 
super-critical infrastructure, armed conflict etc. While emphasizing a fact, governments 
should have the serious intention to carry out actions to protect its citizens but instead they 
follow their political interests. In the divide between citizens and governments, citizens are 
pushing governments to fulfill their legal obligations. 
 
As a result, the thesis proposes the coherent implementation of the existing international 
standards by the means of the additional protocol of Article 17 of the ICCPR as it is essential 
to strike the balance between the parallel demands of privacy, freedom of security, and 
national security in international legal instruments so that they will be more willingly 
accepted by the leading States. 
 
Thus, in order to resolve the present dichotomy of concepts for the balance between executive 
and judicial powers in Europe that cracks the existing framework of the European democracy, 
the thesis introduced the balance concept for the future with the addition of protocol of Article 
17 of the ICCPR and the principles applicable to personal information stored in electronic 
data banks in the public and private sector. 
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Kokkuvõte 
 
Mitmed terrorirünnakud USA-s 2001 aastal tõid endaga kaasa paradigma muutuse 
privaatsuse, infovabaduse ja riigi julgeoleku tasakaalus. Sarnased muutused kaasnesid ka 
teistes riikide, kaasa arvatud Ühendkuningriik ja Prantsusmaa. Samas, laiaulatuslik terroriohu 
ning kuritegevuse ennetus ning sellega võitlus „julgeoleku" kaalutlustel põhjustavad tõsist 
lahkheli olemasoleva inimõiguste ja riikliku julgeoleku tasakaalu suhtes, mis on loodud 
rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste  instrumentide tõlgenduste tulemusena, põhjustades tugevat 
lahkheli Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtu, Euroopa Liidu Kohtu ning USA, Venemaa, 
Suurbritannia ja Hiina kõrgema astme kohtute tõlgenduste vahel. Magistritöö peegeldab 
õiguslikku kontrasti automatiseeritud andmetöötluse praktika kohaldamise suhtes, kus 
rahvusvaheliselt tunnustatud inimõiguste suhtes kohaldatakse täiesti erinevat kontseptsiooni. 
Nimelt, Euroopa andmekaitse põhimõtteks on rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste, ennekõike 
privaatsuse ja infovabaduse eelistus riikliku julgeoleku huvide suhtes, mida kohaldatakse ning 
peetakse õigustatuks kolmeastmelise kontroll-testi läbimise järel: proportsionaalsus, 
vajalikkus ning õiguspärasus. Teiste sõnadega, vaid siis on põhjendatud inimõiguse riive, kui 
see on läbinud nimetatud õiguspärase sekkumise kontrollfiltri. Pärast USA terrorirünnakuid, 
nimetatud tasakaal privaatsuse ja riikliku julgeoleku vahel pöördus vastupidiseks sellele, mis 
juhindus ÜRO Kodanike- ja Poliitiliste Õiguste Paktist, millega on Euroopa seadusandlus ja 
täidesaatev võim kooskõlas.  Sarnaselt, USA trendiga liitusid ja Ühendkuningriik ja 
Prantsusmaa. Hiina ja Venemaa on siinkohal autori arvates erandlikud, kuna on riikliku 
julgeoleku huve õigusliku konflikti oludes eelistanud inimõiguste kaitsele ajaloolistel 
kaalutlustel. Nimetatud tendents on progresseeruv ning haarab endaga infotehnoloogia 
võimekuselt arenevad riigid, mis omakorda paratamatult ohustab olemasolevat arusaamist 
demokraatiast ja õigusriigi põhimõtet. 
 
On tõenäoline, et fragmentaarne jaotumine rahvusvaheliste nõuete täitmise osas jääb alles, 
kuid fundamentaalsetes küsimustes äärmuslikku polaarsust põhjustavates vaadetes tuleb leida 
kompromiss. Magistritöö eesmärgi täitmiseks esitleti kompromissi ÜRO Kodanike- ja 
Poliitiliste Õiguste Pakti artikkel 17 protokolli vormis, kaasnevate definitsioonidega 
“isikuandmed“ ja “andmepank“ jaoks. Arvestades Interneti riigiülest iseloomu ning riikide 
ühise koostöö potentsiaali, on lahenduseks ainumõeldav riikidevaheline kokkulepe, mis 
arvestab esilekerkinud vastakate vastuseisude põhjusi, lähtub riikide vajadustest ning pakub 
maksimaalsel viisil tasakaalustatud kompromisse. Just selleks esitleti käesoleva magistritöö 
uurimisega nimetatud protokolli projekt. Täiendavalt, õigusliku lahenduse õigustuseks räägib 
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ka põhjus, et riikideüleselt kokkulepitud õigusliku instrumendi mõju avaldab nii õigusandliku, 
kohtu- kui täidesaatva võimu poolt harmoonilisele inimõiguste kaitsele, nii riigisiseselt, 
regionaalsel kui kontinentaalsel tasemel.  
 
Magistritöö leidis, et Euroopa inimõiguste kohus ja Euroopa Liidus on tasakaalu privaatsuse 
kaitses, infovabaduse ja riikliku julgeoleku kolmnurksuhtes kohaldanud järjekindlusega ka 
Interneti keskkonda puudutavate õiguste ja huvide põrkumiste korral. See tähendab, et õiguste 
kaitse tagatised on Euroopa kohtute tasandil jäänud muutumatuks. Erinev on olukord USA 
jaoks, mis pärast 2001 terrorirünnakuid USA-s, muutis regionaalset seadusandlust, mis 
muutsid  inimõiguste ja nende erandite omavahelist suhet. Selle tulemusena riiklik julgeolek 
digitaalse kommunikatsiooni juhtudel ületab inimõiguste kaalutlusi. Sarnaselt, magistritöös 
uuritud Ühendkuningriik ning Prantsusmaa järgivad praktikat, mis toetub vastavale 
siseriiklikule seadusandlusele. Õiguskirjanduses on välja toodud, et ka teised Euroopa 
Ühenduse riigid peavad vajalikuks isikuandmete töötlemist rikkudes Euroopa Ühenduse 
andmetöötluse õigusreegleid, riikliku julgeoleku kaalutlustel, kujundades selliselt 
rahvusvahelist praktikat. Seega, võib jõuda seisukohale, et täidesaatva, kohtu- ja 
seadusandlike võimude lahkheli inimõiguste ja riikliku julgeoleku suhte küsimustes on laiem 
kui riiklikul või regionaalsel tasemel, Euroopa Liidu kohtu lahendid on vastuolus ka 
siseriiklike kohtulahenditega, nagu oli märgata Ühendkuningriigi ja Prantsusmaa juhtudel. 
Magistritöö autor on seisukohal, et riikide praktika tendents on demokraatliku senikehtinud 
tasakaalu ohustav ning võib tuua kaasa kontrollmehhanismide kohaldamist, mis ei ole 
kooskõlas kaasaja ühiskonna õigusriiklike tõekspidamistega. 
 
Magistritöö autor annab au arusaamisele, et riikliku julgeoleku strateegiliste kontseptsioonide 
polaarsus ei saa olla lahendatud vaid rahvusvahelise mõjuga õigusliku  instrumendi 
tõlgendusega nõustumisega ÜRO-s. Kuid püstitatud uurimisküsimuse lahendamiseks, kuidas 
leida tasakaal paralleelsete huvide nagu privaatsus, infovabadus ja riiklik julgeolek, 
lahendamiseks autor pakub ÜRO Kodanike- ja Poliitiliste Õiguste Pakti artikkel 17 ühetaolise 
tõlgenduse kokkuleppe projekti, ning pakub definitsioonide “isikuandmed“ ja “andmepank“ 
sõnastust.  
 
2012. a ÜRO inimõiguste Resolutsioon deklareeris, et kõik inimõigused kehtivad ka online 
keskkonnas. Küsimusele, kuidas inimõigusi saab tõlgendada digitaalse keskkonna kontekstis, 
autor vastas esmalt, millised on privaatsuse, infovabaduse ja riikliku julgeoleku huvide 
olemuse elemendid, mida saab kohaldada Internetiga seoses. Järgnevalt uuriti, millised on 
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omavahelised suhtes õigustel omavahel ning omakorda riikliku julgeoleku huvidega. Autor 
vaatas kõiki küsimusi läbi kolmetahulise prisma, kus privaatsus, infovabadus ja riikliku 
julgeoleku huvid on omavahel põimunud ning moodustavad identifitseeritava ruumi 
kohtupraktika tõlgendustele tuginevalt. Peamiselt uuriti Euroopa Inimõiguste praktikat, 
Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktikat, mille pinnalt järeldati prisma piirid. Sellist käsitlust toetab 
veendumus, mis pooldab ÜRO Kodanike- ja Poliitiliste Õiguste Pakti tasakaalu inimõiguste ja 
nende suhtes kohalduvate erandite suhtes, kuna see tasakaal on läbi erinevate ohtu loovate 
aegade ajaloos olnud vastupidav, on ka praegustes oludes põhjust olemasolevat korda 
säilitada ning sellest riikide poolt kinni pidada.  
 
Magistritöö probleemipüstitus pärineb vaatest, mille kohaselt küberküsimustes isikuandmete 
levikuga internetis ja privaatsuskaitse ulatust puudutavate küsimuste lahendamisel piiriüleses 
kontekstis, nagu seda Internet on, ei saa enam piirduda kahe-tasandilise vaatega. Selle asemel 
Internetis sisalduvate isikuandmete piiriülese rahvusvahelise regulatsioon peaks peegeldama 
kõikide oluliste elementide kaalutud tulemust.  
 
Õigus privaatsusele digitaalses inforuumis hõlmab igasugust isikuandmete töötlemist Interneti 
kaudu. Infovabaduse kaitse ulatub igasugusele mõtete, tunnete ning muude isiku 
väljendustele, sõltumata nende õiguspärasusest, ning viisidele, mille abil neid levitatakse. 
Kaasaja riikliku julgeoleku huvide kaitse on iga riigi osas väga erinev, kuid olemuse 
elementidena saab välja tuua riigi olemasolu ja säilimise tagamise kaalutlused laiaulatuslike 
ohtude suhtes, nii sise- kui välisohtude kontekstis.  
  
Järgnevalt uuriti, mis on olnud põhjused valikuteks riikide poolt rahvusvaheliste õiguste 
instrumentide põhimõtetest eemaldumiseks inimõiguste ja nende suhtes kohalduvate erandite 
tasakaalu kontekstis. Töö käigus selgus, et ühelgi põhjusel ei saa olla mõju, mis oleks 
välistanud olemasolevate põhimõtete kohaldamist tasakaalu mõistes, ning need on 
lahendatavad kompleks lahenduste abil, poliitilised, diplomaatilised, õiguslikud ning vajalike 
infotehnoloogia meetmete vastuvõtmisega Interneti arhitektuuri muutmiseks.  
 
Käesoleva magistritöö puudutab laiahaardelist probleemide ringi, kus tekib hulgaliselt 
ulatuslikke  uurimisküsimusi, mis vajaksid põhjalikku uurimist, mida autor loodab teha 
järgmises õppeastmes.  
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